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CHAPTER ONE I 
81\Cl~GROUND INFORMATION ON MALAYSIA, THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE I 
OF TllE DISSERTATION 
I .. Background 
Geographically, Malaysia occupies a central position within the area 
This chapter presents a brief introductory account on Malaysia's 
geographical, historical, political and economic ba~kground. The scope 
of th~ dissertation is outlined in the latter part of the chapter .. 
commonly known as South East Asia. Malaysia is a federation consisting 
'of thirteen states,with eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia namely 
Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perlis,' I 
Selangor, Trengganu and.East Malaysia consisting of Sabah and Sarawak 
which are separated by 6~0 kilometres of water ~ the South China Sea. 
Peninsular Malaya secured independence in 1957 but was joined with Sabah 
and Sarawak in 1963 to form the Federation of Malaysia. 
Malaysia with a tot~l land area of approximately 330, 434 sq. km 
has a.population of about 14.3 million people with an average annual 
population growth rate (1·975 - 1980) of 2.68%. Its population is mainly 
conccntratcd in Peninsular Malaysia which consists of 11.8 million people 
o f \·1 h i c h 5 3 . 9 % a re Ma l a y s , 3 4 . 9 % Ch i n e s e , 1 O . 5 % I n d i a n s a n d 0 . 7 % o the r s . 
Only about 2.3 million.people live in East Malaysia. In Sarawak 63.4% 
ar Mtil ,1r:. and other incligencous people, 31% Chinese and 5.6% others. 
In .i'1h,h G~.1% arc d i9natccl us 'bum'i putr a ' or indigcncous pcop l rs , 
2 1. 5 ~~ h i n . c: iJ n d l ~ . ~ % o h r 
' . 
l 
On chi r.v in~ incl pr. ndcnc Ir om th r3ri Li h in 19r:7, M l ovs i: t1do1 t 
nnrchy. Th 
---- -- 
1 . 1 , L v ·. ii - !\ 1>, , 1 r. ',,ii cl c' n o k r or r c n t i l 











Head of the State, known as the "Yang di Pertuan Agong", is elected for 
five years by nine hereditary Malay rulers of the states.· 
Since independence, successive elections have voted the same 
Government into power. The ruling party in Malaysia is the National 
Front which has enjoyed more than two-thirds majority in Parliament. 
Since gaining independence 1957 Malaysia has stepped up its 
development effort through a series of development plans to accelerate 
economic growth and to diversify the economy. The agricultural sector 
(including fishing and forestry) continues to be the mainstay of the 
economy. In 1980, this sector accounted for about 22% of the Gross 
Domestic Product of the Country and about 40.6% of total labour force was 
employed in the agricultural sector·. Rubber is still an important crop 
in Malaysia accounting for almost 39.5% of the tolal world production 
but efforts to diversify the agricultural sector have led Malaysia to 
become the world's largest producer of palm oil accounting for almost 
57: of total World production. Apart from being the World's leading 
producer of rubber and palm oil, Malaysia is also responsible for 37% 
of the l·lorld's production of tropical hardvoods as well as the major 
producer of pepper. Mala,vs'ia is still the \.Jorld's leading producer of 
tin but its importance to the domestic economv is gradually declining. 
· R c ntly, the Country has also emerged as~ producer and exporter of 
crud. pr. rolcum. · 
11 o \·I i t h .. t an d i n g the i 111 p o r ta n c e of t h e a 9 r i cu lt u r a l s e c to r t o the 
economy , tncro inr nphas is i dir ct d towards the dev lopment.of the 
111an11L curing ctor in rel rt div r i Iv Lh conomv : s 1·1 11 l o 
prov id r.1nplo.vmcn. to i'l ( rov1in lnbour f rec. l n l no th 
m,1n11fi'cturing s e Lor on r ibutrx' , I out ?.1% f Lh Dom · i c Pr clue 










growth rate of 14.3% in the last three years. 
II Score and Objectives of the Dissertation 
The scope·of this dissertation is strictly focussed on the .I 
I 
I 
manufacturing sector as it generally accepted that this sector is one of 
the most important components of overall economic development in the 
Third World. M~laysia and most other developing countries have 
encouraged the growth of manufacturing sector for several reasons 
including potential foreign exchange saving where imports would be produced 
locally for the domestic market. Under-employment and unemployment are 
one of the major problems in a country experiencing rapid population 
growth and these problems could be lessened by the advance of. 
industrialisation. Moreover, low technological levels in most developing 
f 
countries including Malaysia, can be raised by introducing widespread 
industrial activity. 
In the present development plan - the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981 
1985), the manufacturing sector is still expected to play a strategic 
role in the process of economic development as well as to achieve the 
objectives of the Ne11 Economic Policy (NEP). This is clearly indicated 1 •• 
by the fo 11 owi ng extract. 
""l··onufacturing continues to play a strategic role in the 
1Chicvcrnent of the New Economic Policy (NEP)"l and "the 
qovcrnmcnt nas in fact des iqnnteo the manufacturing· sector 
t1 h k .Y,.. ct or of the economy in formulating its long-term 
c n 0111 i c I v c 1 o pme n t p l n " 2 
The~ n rul obj ec t tv of thi di scrtation is to cxann n th po cnt i a l 
for 11 f11 u c or in M~ lt.'/ iil 1-1itllin h 
----- -- 
l . r our ui .1~ l.w J ,1_ r L _n ( 1' r: 1_ - . 1 _ f!__J 
· .i Li y ·; 1 c1 c 11, • r 11111 t1 n L I 111 11 < L 1 n 1 p . ? 3 . 
2. 1lnv r; 111 nt int ,1L1v·,ii, Poli .i r; , nd Pr . lur 










broad policy framework of other government objectives such as "eradicating 
poverty by raising the income levels"1, balanced industrial, growth 
amongst the regions, and technology transfer. 'f The mechanisms used to 
promote industrial development were many ·but the major ones include 
fiscal incentives, tariff protection and the establishment of indu~trial 
·es ta t e s ~ w h i c h a re e x am i n e d i n d e ta i 1. ~! h i 1 s t t he s e po 1 i c i e s u n do u b t e d 1 .Y 
stimulated rapid growth in the manufacturing sector, they were also 
responsible for some undesirable effects such as theyheavy concentration 
I 
' of industry in a few sel~ct areas. Perhaps even greater criticism can 
,., 
be levelled at the capital - intensive nature of the industries which 
developed in response to various government policies, and it is now 
recognised that a more positive approach is required to encourage a 
manufacturing techno 1 o~y which is more appropriate to the factor 
proportions of the country, with special emphasis upon employment 
Unless otherwise stated the data in this dissertation refer to West 
generation. 
Malaysia. Whilst there are now firm indications that Sarawak and Sabah 
will develop manufacturing capability, they have to date experienced only 
a minimal amount of industrial ac t i v i tyanc arc therefore excluded from 
most statistical data. 
lt 
Chapter 2 traces the develor:iment of manufacturing sector from the 
ini i,11 trJtcg_v of import, substitution to the presently favoured export 
l d (JrO\'/ h st rat sv. Othc j. . t i f ;.i_ r < is anpo in mg acets such as regional 
clr.vr.101)111 n i mba 1 nc 0•·1n r 11 · d t 1 f 1 , r 1p ~n con ro o· t1~ manufacturjng sec or; 
I . 
.m11 l .•1111 • n < c n r1 lion n I ,· z cl' t · 1 t · l" 1 . . , ri >u 1 n ( 1 r. a di 11 s din 
·--- .. -- 
ChJp er 2. 










Chapter 3, examines the development of government industrial policies 
in the manufacturing sector since independence. Towards the end of 
the 19GO's the Malaysian government became aware that the pace and 
direction of industrial development was not in accord with its 
aspirations, it therefore took an increasingly interventionist approach 
in an attempt to make manufacturing activity follow more closely the 
guidelines established by the government. This approach is outlined in 
Chapter 4, with particular attention being direct~d to fiscal incentives, 
tariffs and industrial estates. 
Potential future growth of manufacturing not only lies in the ! . 
creation of integrated industrialisatio~, skill development, manpower 
training etc. but also on the prospects for export expansion of the 























DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING SECTOR SINCE 1957 
This chapter outlines the development pattern of the manufacturing 
activity from before independence to the present decade. It is divided• 
into three sections. Section I describesthe development of manufacturing 
·activity in the pre-independence period. Section II describesthe 
development of manufacturing activity from 1957 to 1969 - mainly an 
import substitution approach. Finally section III details the 
development pattern of manufacturing activity from import substitution 
(IS) to export expansion from period of 1970 to 1980. 
I. Pre-Independence Period 
Industrial activity in the pre-independence period was limited to 
f 
the extractive industries including the mining and plantation industries. 
This was a typical colonial pattern of economic activity where primary 
commodities were exported to the metropolitan country of B~itain in 
return for manufactured imports. Although manufacturing activity in the pre- 
;' nclependenc e per i cd existed its contribution to the. economy was very 
insignificant. By International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(ICRD) classification, the most importa~t industrial activities in 
19~7 were handicraft industries, primary processing and engineering 
ac t iv i t ies . /\11 these industries wer e small-scale based on family 
wor k rs and produced only a small amount of i ndus tr i a l output. These 
indu ri s vier 1dell distributed throughout West Malaysia and employed 
C'Jlii .o con idcrao lc numb rs of wor kcr s who accounted for up to. 6.7 
p .r cent f th. < ctiv 1( bour f re in \·I st M l ay i o . 1>Jn r 11 i p po · rn 
ype of nh nuf ac ur i n ac .tv i ·i is lur i n h r r - 
indcp .nd n pcrior' nr dHiic11l · o 1 s cs s vlinc lo he i n: le.qui cy of 










II Patt_ern df Manufacturing Activity - 1957 to 1969 
At independence Malaysia display~d characteristics associated with 
1 colonialism. In common w i th most other newly independent developing 
, countries, Malaysia e~barked upon an industrialisation strategy. There 
were various reasons for such a strategy including the S. Kuznets and 
~ I I 
H.13. Chenery argument that industrialisation can be the basis for 
·: development particularly in the long-run period. It also enables a 
;-' 
country to be less dependent on the export of prima~v commodities which 
largely fluctuate in price and cause uncertainty in foreign earnings. , , 
Industrialisation creates opportunities for labour force training which 
4-( 
will in turn have ext~rnal effects on the whole econom~. Finally rapid 
industrialisation is able to solve unemployment problerrsover a long-run 
p '2 r i od. So~e of the above reasons of industrialisation are to he found in • 
the International Bank for Reconstruttion and Development (IBRD) Report 
(1955} and Working Party Report i.e. which basically stressed the need 
to diversify the economy and to solve the unemployment problems. 
There was not much progress of manufacturing activity during the 
early inaependence period. The development of man~facturing activity 
during the early ir.dependence period was characterised by poor and 
uncoordinated planning. A consequence of which was the indiscriminate 
development of manufacturing activity. 
1; 
" For instance there was wasteful 
competition between firms producing similar products which competed for 1 
av ry limited mcrk t: Wasteful competition c~n be observed from the 
'xi ncr. of tvo wee t ned condensed milk finns, five pharrnaceuticul 
f i l"IW. I fiv l 
. 'I 
na in firm u n l thr va tch firm Th low d v lopmcnt 
of man f ac tur i n9 act iv i ty at ii r l y ind ncnd nc period i) l 0 portly 










f a t tr i+utab l e to the open system which allowed British Conrnonwea l th 
., 
• manufactured goods free access without being subjected to tariffs. This 
preferential system was clearly revealed in the official Tariff Schedule 
published in 1957 where the imported goods from non British Commonwealth 
industrial strategy policies were first followed by foreigners rather 
v 
than the local investors due to several reasons, which included lack of 
l/ 
experience in,manufacturing activity, 9reater preference to invest in 
Jr ~ 
the retail trade, property development and extractive industries and 
> unwillingness of foreign and local investors to ·~erge in the form of 
Countries were subjected to l 0-20~s. of tariff prutect i oru s, . 
~Initial industrial strategy was based on the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Report and Working Party which 
aimed to stimulate the development of the manufacturing sector. The 
joint venture. Major .foreign investors came from Europe, United States 
of America, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bahamas, Formosa, 
India and Japan. 
From the period since independence to 1969, industrial s tr ateqv was 
based on the import substitution (IS) pattern,such a pattern can be 
I 
traced fro~ the structure of Malaysiasifuported goods. As consequence, 
whilst consumer qoods as a proportion of 'total imports significantly ·frll fr 
52~ in 1965 to 20% in 1970, investment goods and intermediate goods 
i n c r c il s c d i n th c i r s h a re f r om l 4 . 3 % i n 1 9 G O to 2 8 . 2 p e r c en t i n 1 9 7 0 










- Machinery and Equipment as a Proportion.of Total 




Countries 1960 1961 1970 1973 
Mulaysia 14. 3 21.4 28.2 - 
Thailand 25.0 30. 7 35.6 31. 7 
Singapore 7.0 14.4 22.8 28.0 
Philippines 36.0 31. 3 35. 4 29.0 
Indonesia 17. l 25.5 34.3 - 
Source : World Bank Tables, 1976. 
The two pillarsupon 1vhich"f.Import Subs t i tut i on Industrialisation (ISI) 
stratcgv· was based were tariff protection and t~~ incentives. Tax 
incentives were granted under pioneer status policy which accounted for 
the growth of pioneer establishmentswhich then became the leading edge 
of the manufacturing activity. The number of firms granted pioneer 
status not only increased from year to year as shown in table 2.2 but 
it also attracted more large scale ente~prises than medium or small-sized 
cs t .1 b l i s hm o n ts . [3 a s e d o n t a b 1 e 2 . 2 , to ta 1 ri um be r of f i rm s u n d e r p i one e r 
s tctus in 1959 was only 18 but increased to 146 in 1968. Although the 
absolute number of establishments under pioneer status were fairly small 
their contribution to manuf ac tur ino output , value added and capital stock 
,.,JS s iqn if icant , but in terms of ernp l oymen t qcner at i on their contribution 
1·1,1s s l i oh ly l ovcr , Par t i cu ler ly before mid 1970' the contribution of 
pioneer st blil".11111 nts to mp l ovm nt g.n rt lion 1>1t r Io iv ly incon i nt 
"'i th QOV . r11111cn t i1'i pi ril i ens to rcil m re j b . Th. r 
cst.1hl i:;h111cn 'i9 1n.r1 ~11 S'l 1< bo i r inuu t 1·1, lu Lo h .ir hi hly ( ! 1 l\l 









--------·- ·-- .. -- 
I . -e I Value I Fixed I % of· Salaries I .. . ~ a~ I Output % of Added % of Capital Employ- % of % of ··:an f.l (MS'OOO) Manuf Manuf. I Manuf. ment Manuf. & \·!ages Manuf. 
I 
{MS'OOO) (MS'OOO} No. (M$'000) 
I 
ss J I 8 0. 10,671 0.8 4,305 1. 5 n.a. n. a. l ,296 2. 1 1. 656 1.8 
I 
I .; 3 85 
I 1.0 I 195,424 11. 6 72,328 17.2 n .e. 7,171 8.2 16,586 10.8 n. a. 
I ,.. i ·6 1.6 895,126 29.3 278,274 32.2 449,027 50.4 23 '115 17.7 63,255 23.7 I 
I 
~ 
_, 246 n.a. 1 ,393 ,361 33.5 450,933 35.6 699,947 54.3 43,624 28.8 
106,866 29 :5· 
f . 
0 
'-'.c.. facturing excludes on-estate processing. 
:-:c. . f. = e nuf ac tur i ng 
.a. = ot available 
Source: Hoffmann, L. and Ee, T.S., Industrial Growth and Employment and Foreign Investment in 
Peninsular Malaysia, p.37, Table III.l 










Through the rioneer industry policy, efforts to diversify the industrial 
. . I . 
base were relatively successful in the period 1957 to 1969. The number 
of industries set up 0nder pioneer st~tus increased and included food 
products, chemical products, basic metals, non-metallic goods, mineral 
products, fabricated metal and miscell~neous products (see table 2.3). 
Other forms of ~truttural characteristics of manufacturing activity 
before 1969 can be traced from the ownership, size distribution and 
regional location. 
Ownership pattern of economic development can be easily traced 
after the immediate independence period. This was characterised by 
e~hnic imbalances along different economic furiction. Based on table 
t 
2.4 l·:alays we re do+inant in the traditional and .backwaro agricultural 
sector which was in direct contrast to the .Chinese and Indian~ who were 
relatively dispersed in different sectors. About 70% of total Malaysian 





total Malays· and 11% of total Indians were involved in the manufacturing . I . 
. I 
activity. This pat tern led to the process of restructuring of ethnic 
tmbu l anccs along the Nevi Economic Policy (NEP) objectives which is 
examined in Chapter 3. 
Generally, the local investors involved in the manufacturing activity 
lwr1)1·r. 1%9 wcr the Moloysian Chinese. Most often the Malaysian 
Cllincsr. 1·1r.rr. pr dominant in the sma l l seal e tnb l i sbmcnt s wh i l s t the 
luqo r.r; ubl irhmcnt "' re ma in ly foreign owned. Gused on table ·2.5 
ti b () ll l u 7';', 0 f 0 L ( l i n du '; Lr i I l r . ll b 1 i hm n ts \'v' r 111 11 - a l l i n l c 
In contr as t , th l arq 'ic, l or at OU e. t h 1 i . 11111 • n L nl u ll t 
------ 
l . le: 'i Lhan ?.O full t im 1·inrky, 111pl yc1tl in LIL in 111. i·i, 1 . illlic;hm n 













TYl'E OF 1i\1)US'l1UES Uf\.'DER PIO'.\EEl1 Sl'J\TUS IN 10G3 and 1008 (IN J\J3g)Lt!I'E 
!\'Uri IBIBS) 
( ·. 
TI'PES OF UNDUSIBY 1963/TOTAL 1968/TOTAL 
NlnllBER OF P. S. NillIT3ER OF P. S. 
Food Industry 12 23 
Chemical and Chanical · 
Prcxlul!t Industry 22 31 I 
Jasic ~lctals 3 5 
xon ~1ct:1llic ·Products 5 f 7 .. 
Fabricated Meta l Products 12 14 





Source: adopted fran table '15, 46,· 49, 50 and 51 fran 
V. V. Bhanoji Rao - ~bl".:.,vsia Develoe:r.£nt ~nd P~li~ 
19·'17-1971. Singapore University Press 1980, p lOG-121 










DIS1'nIDUrIOi'1 OF El!PIDYMfNf BY EilINIC GROUP i 1917 I (IN PERCFNf/\GF.3) 
S1X'TOO MALAYS CHINESE. INDIANS TOTAL 
% % & OTIIERS 'coo 
% 
l. /\r;riculture 57 30 13 889 
( :\) pc;) &1.11 t 70 27 3 508 
(Hice) (88) (10) (2) (333) 
(b) Rubber 39 33 28 381 
~. ~lining 11 71 15 39 
3. ~llnufacturing 19 70 11 125 
I. Services 27 48 25 405. 
). Governnen t 54 11 35 105 . 1, I lbtal Dnplo:r11x:nt 44 40 f 16 1,565 .1 ' 
I I ! Source: G. D. Ness, nurcaucracv and Rural DcvcloErent in . { 
~lllavsia. University of California ·press, 19G7, p.30 













Table 2.5 - Distribution of Employment by Size of Establishments 
1959 
- Size of Group Paid Salaries & I in terms of Establishments Gross Output Employees \..'ages Full-time 
I 
' 
Emriloyrncnt (No.) 0/ (M$'000) % (No.) 0/ (M$'000) % IO /O 
0 l '026 20.50 9' 115 0.72 874 l. 41 410 0.44 1-4 l '916 38.28 60,345 4.78 5,705 9.26 6 '166 6.92. 5-9 753 15.04 97,301 7. 72 5,525 8.96 7,051 7.82 
I 10-19 639 12.7G 124,978 9.91 9,603 15.59 13,153 14.63 20-29 275 5.49 90,582 7. 18 6, 729 10.92 9,995 11.17; 
I 30-49 183 3.65 119,829 9.50 7, 177 11. 65 10,324 11 . 50 
' 50-99 133 21 . 19 9, 149 14.85 14,927, I 2.65 267, 119 16. 64, 100-199 49 0.97 222,603 17.66 6,417 l 0. 41 10,408 11. 62 200-499 25 0.49 232 '776 18.46 7,325 11 . 89 11 ,405 12. 73. 
t ! 500+ 5 0.09 35,472 2.80 31.093 5.02 5,710 6. 361 
I Total 5,004 100.00 l,260,120 100.00 61 , 597 100.0 89,549 100.00 . 
Under 20 . Empl oyees 4,334 86.59 291 ,739 23. 13 21 ,707 35.2 2 26,780 29 .81: . Over 100 
Err.p 1 oyees 79 l. 57 490,851 38.94 16,835 27.3 3 27,523 30. 731 
Source: Census of Manufacturing, Federation of Malaya, 1959 or 
L. Hoffmann and Tl!n Siew Ee, Table II, l,p.17, 
Industrial Growth, Employment and Foreign Investment in 
fcninsular Malaysia, Kuall! Lumpur, O·xford Un ivcrs t ty Press, 










T~blc 2.6 - West Malaysia - Regional Di~tribution of Manufacturing 





Gross Output Paid Salaries & l Es t ab l i shmenta Emplovees* vlaqes States 
(No. ) O' (MS'Ooo: C/ (No.) O/ (MS I 000 )' % l I 7o 10 10 
l. Joh ore 610 12. 19 238,782 18.94 10,3871 16.86 15,742 17.57 
4,9901 
. 
I 2. Kcd ah 517 10.33 126,175 l 0. 01 8. l 0 6,794 7.59 
3. l.e l antan 194 3.87 18,841 1.49 2,211 · 3.58 2,081 2.32 
4, Malacca 178 3.55 55,245 4.38 ·l '786 2.89 2,494 2.78 
5. :iegri Sembi 1 an 257 5. 13 69 '5Qt1 5.51 2,8091 4.56 4 .345 I 4.85 
6. Pa hang 259 5. 17 17,633 1. 39 l , 393 1 2.26 2' 113 2.35 
7. Penang 724 14.46 l 58 '361 12.56 I 1 l . 90 10,054 1l.22 7,3331 
8. Pera k l '113 22.24 238,153 18.89 10,7851 17.50 14 'l 34 15.78 
9. Perl is 44 0.87 7,053 0.55 " 353j 0.57 466 0.52 
10. Selangor 1 ,077 21. 52 326,540 25.91 I 30,576 34. 14 18·,8791 30.64 
11. Treng9anu 51 l. 01 3,833 0.30 553 0.89 750 0.83 
Hcst Malaysia 5,004 100.00 l,260,120 n oo. oo 61,597 100.00 89,5'19 100.00 
Urbanised 
states(-)1- 2,914 58.22 723,054 57.36 36,997 60.04 54,764 61.14 
718+10(+)1 3,524 70.41 961 ,836 76.30 47,384 76.90 70,50G 78.71 . --··- 
Other s tu tes l ,480 29.59 298,284 23.70 14,213 23. l 0 19, 043 21 .29 
Sources: Survev of Munufacturing Industries, 1959 .Ku;_).la Lumpur, or see 
Hoffmann, Lutz - Industrial Growth Employment and Forei~ 
Investment in Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford 










·1.S7 per cent of total industrial establishmentsin 1~59. Small-scale 
cstablishmentsgenerated a relatively greater employment share although 
[ndus tr i a l output was slightly lower than the large-scale establishments. 
For i ns tcnce in 1959 small scale establishments acco_unted for only 23% l. 
of gross output compared to large-scale establishments· which generated 
about 39~ of gross output. But· large scale establishments contributed 
relatively less employment, accounting for only 27% of total employment 
compared to the small scale es tab li shment s which accounted for 35% of total 
cmp l oymcn t. 
Within the period of 1957 to 1969, the industrial 9rowth pattern 
was characterised by uneven regional development. This feature is 
comr:ion to many other developing countries, where rapid urbanisation and 
I economic development were unevenly distributed. tMalaysiasregional 
development is biased toward the West Coast of Pensinular Malaysia since 
most of the rapid economic development and urbanisation has taken place 
1n four major states - Penang, Selangor, Perak and Johore. As early· 
as 1959 these four states accounted for more than 75% of gross output 
and employment shares (see table 2.6). 
ltJ·rn~t:_ern of Mi1nufucturing Activity - 1970 to 1980's 
Fran 1968 industrial development efforts were intensified and the 
9ovcrnmcnt udoptcd a more positive ·and strategic role, with a willingness 
to Jctivcly par t ic ipa t e in the manufacturing sector if it was deemed 
ncCCSSilry. This chanqc of policy wus in re pan e to the growing 
r a l i .. a t i on 0 f th e gov rnmcnt that Malaysia hud reuched a stage· where 
OH)S l oppor tun i ti s for impor t ub ti Lution llnd been cxll u t d, nnd 
that in order to na inta tn th mom n um of ononic 9rov1 h new s r~rtr.9i 
wc1·c csscntiul. Mr.rl"urcs to stirnulote oxpor t orir.ntcd intlu tri s can 









rnpid export expansion of manufactured goods, with an average growth. 
rntc at 26.2% per annum. Table 2.7 shows how manufactured exports share 
In total commodity exports almost doubled from 11% in 1970 to 20.6~~ in 
1980. Consequently, as manufactured exports increased, the Malaysian 
principal export primary commoditi~S ' I i.e. tin and natural rubber have ·I 
This was largely due to the government's relatively declined in importance. 
Table 2.7 - Malaysia: Major Commodity Exports 1970-80 ($Million) 
Corranod ity 1970 1980 Av.annual growth 
s % $ 0/ rate (%)1971-80 10 
Rubber 1724 33.4 4860 17. 1 10. 9 
Tin 1013 19.6 2504 8.8 9.5 
Saw logs 643 12. 5 2435 8.6 14.2 
Sawn timber 199 3.9 1221 4.3 19.9 • Pa lrn oil 264 5. 1 2576 9. 1 25.6 
Crude petroleum 164 3.2 7200 25.3 46.0 
Copper - - 113 0.4 - 
Pepper 59 l. 1 136 0.5 8.7 
Cl!nncd Pineapple 43 0.8 72 0.2 5.3 
Cocoa - - . 189 0.7 - 
Ml!nufuctures 572 11. 1 5865 20.6 26.2 
Other Cornmodi ty 
Exports 482 9.3 1274 4.4 10.2 
Total gross 
I Co1 iotti ty exports 5163 100.0 28,445 100.0 18 ;6 I , _ _ 
J 
Sumnary of Turgcts, Strategies and Programmes, Page 5, Table 1, 
Millilysia Government Puhlicution 1980. 
Source: FourtI1 Mulaysia Plan 1981-1985 -!\Review of progress end 
cf Iort s to d i v rs i Iy th c onomy thr0u9'1 th gr'owth of mnnufucturing 
octiv1ty. Tilblc 2.0 indicot om of th 111n in a r r Ill nufucturing 
9r01·1lh in the 197Q'i. (x~or r, Of rlyv/O d , V nr. I"< ncl l ockoonr I. in r 1 d 











Table 2.8 - Peninsular Malaysia: Value-Added Growth in Manufacturi~g 
1970-80 
Share(%) Averaoe Annual ' orowtn rate(% 
1 1970 1975 1980 1971-75 j 1976-80 1971-80 . 
I, ' I I 
10.9 9. a. 2. 1 7 • 1 I 4.0 I rood products 15. 3 
./ 
I Oils and fats 6.3 12. 9 14. 1 26.0 17.1 22.6 ,. 
Beverages and tobacco 12. 1 10. 9 9. 9,; 6.9 9.8 8.0 
Textiles 2. 1 2.5 '3. 0 13.3 19.7 15.7 
l·:ood and wood products 12 . .4 12. 1 12:0 8.7 13.0 10.3 
Paper and printing 1. 0 0.9 1..0 7.6 17.3 11 . l 
Industrial Chemicals 3.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 7.0 3.8 
Chemical products 6.0 5.4 5. 1 6.5 11 .2 8.3 I l 
f 
f Petroleum products '1. 2 3. l 3.5 3.5 17.0 8.3 .. 
Rubber products 6.7 5.5 4.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 
Cement' 5.4 4.9 5.2 7.0 15.2 10.0 
Non-metallic 2.0 1. 6 1. 7 4.7 14. 7 . 8 -, 3. 
Basic me ta 1 3. 1 3.2 3.6 10.3 11.8 ... 10.8 
Fabricated me~al " 4.6 4.2 4.5 7.2 16. 2. 1b.5 . -- 
Electrical machinery 2.9 3.0 3.4 10.8 17.6 13.3 
Tr ans port cqui pment 5.3 5.2 4.9 8.6 11. 6 ~.7 
Other manufactures ) .3 11. 4. 12. 4 36.4 16.3 28.5 
-- -- -- 
Total manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 11.6 13.5 12.5 
-- -- - 
Source: Four_!.!l_T~~si Plan 1981-1985, extracted from Table 16.1 











grew at the average of 13.3% per annum. Within the electrical machinery, 
1 
~ 
~lectronics grew at a spectacular rate of 69% per annum to increase 
19 
wood products industry to 10.3% per annum and accounted for total value. 
added of 12% in 1980. Rubber products were increasing exports to the 
overseas markets such as household, surgical gloves, heavy duty tyres 
and medical equipment. Value added growth of rubber products by 1980 
averaged 5.6% per annum. Textiles exports increased by 26% and 
resulted in the overall growth of 16% per aDnum. Total share of textile 
to manufacturing sector have also increased from 2. 1% in 1970 and 2.5% 
in 1975 to 3.0% in 1980. The share of textile output for export markets 
Increased from 23% in 1970 to about 50% by 1980. Electrical machinery 
fts share in manufactured exports from 1.8% in 1970 to 37% in 1980. 
Tnble 2.8 also suggests that import substitution on consumer goods 
' reached its saturation point. For instance food ·.products share to valve 
added growth in the manufacturing sector declined from 15.3% in°1970, 
10.9"' in 1975, to 9.3~~ in 1980. Nevertheless, the overall qrowth of 
value-added in the manufacturing sector increased from 11 .6% per annum 
. fn 1971-1975 to 13.5% per annum in 1976 to 1980. 
In the decade of the 1970's manufacturing activity proved to be the 
~t dynamic sector of the economy and acted as a catalyst or 'engine 
of 9rowth' to stimulate the development process. Table 2.9 shows a 
"l911lr!cant change in the structure of the economy be tween 1970 and 1980. 
I nur,1cturing ocl ievcd the highest rate of growth i.e. 13.5% in 1976 
to l9no 1~hich cnob Icc it to increase i ts c ont r i bu t i on to Gross Domestic 
frod11ct (r.Or) fro111 13:~% rn 1970 to lG.~% and 20.5% in 1975 and· 1980 
rr.~p~ctivcly. ~lllilst manuf'ac tur inq ctor gain cl in its uupor-tenc , th 
9rlcultural sector' shar to Gro" D mcs t i c Product (GDP) d clin d 









~..? .... :? 2.9 - l'• Jysia:Gross Dcce s t ic Procuc t by Sector or Or i q i n , 1970-80 
(S million in 1970 prices) 
Share of GOP (%) Se tor 
1970 1975 1980 1980 1971-80 1970 1975 














l , 214 
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1 , 186 
592 







































and wa te r 365 
r ·c , storage and 1 ,071 
12.6 12.8 13.3 7.3 8.2 ~~ es2 e and retail trade, hotels 
I e • res· a rants ri ance , insurance, real estate 
e r1 b s · es s s erv i ces 
3,295 6.3 1,633 2,219 




























'er ser ces 
I ess: lil;J .. ed bank service charges 
j P1 rs : ·;:-, ort duties 
, Eq ·~ s: ros s domestic product at 
t 'J' rcha ser s.' value 
7.8 8.6 7. 1 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985, extracted from Table 2-l, p.11, Malaysia 
Government Publication 1980 . 









table 2.10 that the qr ow th rate of employment generated by manuf ac tur inq 
sector was the highest i.e. 7 .6% per annum from 1971 to 1980 .. Howeve r, the 






·It can be seen from 
Within the period of mid 1970's to 1980, the 
i ' 
generated considerable employment opportunities. 
a91·f cultural sector contri but ed. less than 2~ per annum to .tbe I . 
i - 
1 ~ 
employment growth rate within the same period. As a consequence, .. 
the agricultural employment share decreased substantially from 51% 1 
In 1970 to 41% in 1980.As reported bytheFourth Malaysia Pl an (1981-1985) 
net employment created by the m~nufacturing sector increased to 416,000 
which amounted for about 25% of total new employment. Whilst agricultural 
which contributed 8% and 6% per annum. Finally, a strong overseas demand 
cspcr.iully in the electronics components industry permitted high growth 
sector employment shares declined, the manufacturing sector'semployment 
share increased from 11% in 1970, to 14% and 16% in 1975 and 1980 
rcspectivelv. f 
The growth of employment created in the manufacturing sector ~as 
attributabl~to several factors. First, increase~ of manufacturing value 
t added a~ 13.5% per annum in 1976-1980 (see table 2.8). Second, 
government measures to increase labour intensive industries such as 
electrical .machinery and textiles(Clothing) which increased their 
"'or·forccs at average annual rates of 22% and 13% respectively. Other 
tynr.sof labour intensive industries included wood and rubber products 
rct cs . 
From the 1970'5 the manuf ac tvr inq sector tended to create more 
c111ploy111cnt error uniti than in th prev i ou dccede of th 1960 
sono ext nt thi wa dir-oc t ly n rcsul t of th hiln9 f s trntcqv which 
dlrr.ctcd mor at tent ion to 11 bour int ns iv xpor t or i nt d i ndus tr i s . 
Thr. ~rllntin9 of pion r ~>L u o th c typ ~ f inclus ry tmul a tcd 
,. I 
t 










-- --- ---- 
·~··•-..• :~-2 , res ry and fishing 
.... -; 
- I I 
~ ,gas and water 
IT. a•S;J t, s t r a qe and communication 
::~ l es e l e and re ta i l trade, hotels 
ar.2 2s-2:.:. ants 
I ?~~:, .... e, .: su~ance, real estate and ~s .. 2ss s e rv i ce s 
~-~2r .~2 .L services 
I 
. :~2:- Se 1 i ce s 
I 
I -~:., '.:I For E 
J
I ..;;.:;;; 1..-:::nt 
;:er:;J y;-:a rate ( % ) 
I 1910 1975 1980 Average Annua 1 I ~stimated 1 Share of Estimated Share of Estimated Share of row th 1-~ t e ( ::-; ) 
Employment! total 
I 
Emp 1 oyrne n t tota 1 Employment total 1971 1976 19 71 I , ( · coo) , on ( I 000) (%) ( I 000) (%) -75 -20 -80 
l,714.6 50.5 1,923.5 45.3 2,066.9 40.6 2.3 l. 5 l.9 
88.6 2.6 88.3 2. 1 89.6 l. 7 -0. 1 0.3 0. l 
386.5 11.4 572.0 13.5 803. l 15.8 8.2 7.0 7.6 
136. 7 4.0 187.8 4.4 262.8 5.2 6.6 7.0 6.8 
26.5 0.8 33.2 0.8 49.5 1.0 4.6 8.3 6.5 
115. 1 3.4 165.5 3.9 193.2 3.8 7.5 3. 1 5.3 
371. 1 10. 9 503.4 11. 8 648.5 12.7 6.3 5.2 5.7 
31. 5 0.9 40.7 0.9 52.l l.O 5.3 5. l 5.2 
396.6 11. 7 55S.8 13. l 710. 1 13.9 7.0 5.0 6.0 
128. 7 3.8 ~ 176.9 4.2 217.7 4.3 6.6 4.2 5.4 
3,395.9 100.0 4,247.1 l 00. 0 5,093.5 100.0 4.6 3.7 4. l 
10,776.9 12,449.9 14,261.2 
3,681.9 4,538.8 5,380.0 
286.0 291. 7 286.5 
7.8 6.4 5.3 ' 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985, extracted from Table 4-6, p.81, Malaysia 
Government Publication 1980. 
PET? rrr:-,; ,, '« , "..., 
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employment generation within the manufacturing sector. Not only did 
~tisolutc numbers of pioneer establishments increase from 18 in 1959 to 
210in.1970 and even more to 473 in 1978,~ut they generated an average 
or 14,200 new jobs annually. As such pioneer industries employment 
s 1~rc in the manufacturing sector increased from 10% in 1970 to 23% 
fn 1978. 1 
In the period of 1970 to 1980 decade, there were also changes in 
the ownership and size distribution pattern. Based on table 2.ll 
foreign ownersh tp appears to be high in the Malaysian economy. About 
61~ of share capital in the economy was dominated by foreign owner sh ip . 
~ ~ost dynamic sector i.e. manufacturing was also dominated by foreign 
investors who acco0nted for about 60%. Modern agriculture, mining and 
wholesale activities form the highest foreign 01~nership. This indicated 
3 restructuring policy under New Economic Policy'to change the pattern 
or cvner s h ip of capital in the corporate sector by 1990 such that 
. P~laysiansown and manage 70%, with Malays and other indigeneous people 
ace unting for at least 30%. The restructuring pattern of ownership 
Is 11ndcrstandt1ble for the Malaysian government to ensure political stability 
trh I ch is ano ther important factor for fur-ther economic development. 
As industrial development has proceeded in Malaysia there has been 
~ H"Y.Cd Chonge in the importance Of industries in relation to size 
nil vner s hip . For instance the small scale es tab l i shments wh i ch emp loy 
lMs than 20 full t inc workers experienced a rapid decline in the 
r tilnvn·rnt and output sharcs . In 1959, about 23% und 35% of industrial 
011 1111 , nd r.mploymcnt sh r rc spcct ivo ly w re account d f'or by sma l 1 
l , ', I' r ll r l h M ,, 1 ii y 'i L1 P l ii n ( l fl 1 - 1_ n_:) , Mi\ 1 l1 y i a n Gov rn no n t 











J.''ble_l_JJ_ - Foreign Ovmership in the Malaysian Economy, 1970 
- 
Share Capital Value of Fixed 
Assets 
Foreign% - M$'000 Foreign% M$'000 
Agriculture '{l ,432,400) (75.4) ( 14, 901 , 620* 1 (25.4) 
Rubber 1,134,163 77. 7 10,890,000 20.4 
Oil Palm} 298,237 66.8 2,945,810 30.3 
Coconut 1,051,550 6.7 
Tea 14,260 54.8 
r; 1 n Ing (543,497) (72.5) (311,600) (55. l) 
Tin 434,477 71. 5 
Other 109,020 76.4 
Hanufacturing 1 ,348, 245 59.6 l , 128, 400 51.0 
Construction 58,419 34. l 63,500 5.9 
Irens port . 81 ,887 12.0 ' ( n. a) Trade (605,164) (63.6) .. (n.a) 
\:ho l cs e le 450,593 70. l 
Rctilil 15'1,571 44.5 
financial Sector {636,850) (52.3) ( n. a) 
Otrnks 93,549 35.2 
I nsuri1 nee 7,670 55.3 
Othrr 536,631 55.2 
Other Industries 582,516 ' . 31. 4 ( n. a) 
- 
To ,, 1 5,288,978 60.7 (16,405,120) (27.6) ..... -- 
n.il. =not uvoilable 
"Sourc : L. Hof frna nn , Tan Siew Ee, Table VII.I, page 215, 
_1~1~.t:riill Gro\'1th, Emplo,"ment and Foreign 
Jnv .. L111.nt in Pcn insu l ar M1 l av in, Oxford Univ r ity . . .. - ----- 










"Tab le 2.12 - Distribution of Employment by Size of Establishments 
1971 
Size of Group I Gross Paid Salaries & 
I In terms of stablishment· Output Employees ~·I ages 
full-time 
Employment (No. ) % (M$'000) % (No.) OI (M$'OOQ) % lo -· --~ 
0 65 1. 93 3, 494 0.08 75 0.05 41 0.02 
1- 4 201 5.96 19,491 0.47 860 0.51 949 0.26 
5-9 671 19.9"0 89,827 2. 16 5,168 3.05 7,525 2.07 
10-19 803 23.81 263,0421 6.32 11 , 953 7.06 19,342 3.33 
20-29 434 12.87 189,6531 4.55 11,230 6. 64· 18,777 5. 17 . 
30-49 I 447 13.26 348,259, 8.36 17,377 10. 27 32,531 8.96 I 
50-99 I 384 11 .39 521 ,680j 12. 53 26,852 15.87 57,474 15.84 
100-199 
I 
199 5.90 829,481' 19.92 27 ,746116.401 69,039 19.03 
200-499 136 4.03 1,157,259 27.79 25. 14 I 42,fOl 24.941.91,209 SOOt I 32 0.95 741,962 17.82 2 5 , 7A 0 l 5 . 21 6 5 I 9 81 18. 18 I -- 
Tota 1 I I • 3, 3 72 100. Oc'4, 164, 14 9 100.00 ~69.202 I 00.00j362,867 1100.00 
I ndcr 20 
nriloyees l I 7 4 0 51.60 375,854 9.03 18,056 10. 67 27,857 7.68 
I Ov r 100 
~1 l oyccs 367 10.88 2 '728, 702 65.53 95,687 .56.55 226,229 62.35 
. 
vrccs : Survey of Manufacturing, \·Jest Malaysia, Vol. 1, 1971 
L. Hoffmann and Tan Siew Ee, Industrial Growth, 
.E~plovn1ent und Forei.gn Investment in Pensinular Malaysia, 










Tnblc 2.13 - West Malaysia Regional Distribution of Manufacturing 
Establishments and Other Selected Data 
1971 
States 










5. tlcgri Sembilan 
6. P"hilng 
7. Pcnanq 
8. Pcr a k 










473 14. 03 
51 1.51 






























1 ~est Malaysia 3,372 no0.00 4,164,149 100.00 169,202 100.0 362,867 100.00 
576 17.08 423,561 10.2 
11 0.32 9,192 0.2 ' 
1,167 34.60 1,993,902 47.9 















2,216 65.71 889,919 69.4 112,786 66.6 256,476 70.68 
2,673 79.27 3,455,892 83.0 141 ,307 83.5 309,510 85.29 
699 20.73 
• include aart-time employees. 
708,257 17.0 27,895 16.5 53,357 14.71 
Sources: Survey of Manufacturing Industries, 1971, Vol. 1, Kuala 
Lumpur 
or L. llof fnu nn and Tan Sie1-1 Ee, Industrial Growth Employment 
!nrl Fnrciqn Investment in Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 










"t'lll? es tab l isbments . Gut, in 1971 only 9% to 11% of industrial output 
nd.cmployment shares respectively were generated by small scale 
s t ab l i sbments (see table 2.12 and 2.5). The reverse pattern occurred 
(or l ar qer scaie establishments where their industrial output and 
e.;iloymcnt shares rapidly increased fr001 39% and 27~~ in 1959 respectively 
lo 66'C and 57% in 1971. 
The regional imbalance referred to earlier in this Chapter became 
' .ore pronounced as industrv expanded. In 1971 fodustrial establishments 
located in the four main states (Penang, Selangor, rerak and Johore) 
tncrcased from 70% in 1959 to 79% of total establishments in 1971. 
Goss output and employment shares of the four main states also increased 
(se~ table 2.13 and 2.6). The heaviest concentration was in Selangor 
which alone contributed about 40% of total manuf~cturing establishmentsand 
9cncratcd more than 40% of the total industrial output and employment 
shares in 1971. 
In sum, from the period of pre-independence to the present decade 
the mJnufacturing sector has proved to be a dynamic element in Malaysian 
re n mic development. Unlike many developing countries Malaysia also 
directed considerable attention to the igricultural sector thus achieving 
rca~on~hly balJnced pattern of growth with increasing interdependence 
n CO'npl .mentar i tv between the hJO sectors. Although imbalances are 
(lf\,,,.l,v 11rr11rcnt they ore much less 'pronounced than tn many other 




















. CllM.,HR THREE 
Ot\'[LOPMErlT OF GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
From the beginning the Malaysian government clearly identified 
.3nur~cturing as a dynamic element in its overall growth strategy. This 
chapter examines thre~ major components of the government's 
fndustrialisation policy - ·fiscal policy, tariff protection and the 
rstablishment of industrial estates. The first part of the chapter 
covers the period up to 1968, whilst the second part is devoted to the 
pc rl o'd thereafter when important changes took· p 1 ace . 
The analysis indicates a rather pragmatic approach by a government 
which adapted its policies in the light of changing circumstances, 
especially the willingness of the government to adopt an 'interventionist 
~onroach' if it considered that the pace and dir~ction of industrial 
dcvclorment was falling short of its expectations. 
t. Early Industrial Policies in Manufacturing Sector since 1957 to 1968 
~fter gaining independence, in 1957, it did not take long for the 
11.l 1 ays i an government to set up promo ti ona 1 measures to has ten the qrowth · 
of the manufacturing sector. Thi~ effort was especially desirable to 
reduce dependency on tin and natural rubber which accounted for about 
R0t of exports and 30% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at that time. 1 
0 pcndcnce on a narrow range of primary commodities led to the instability 
MH! unccr to i nty of gov rnment revenue wh i ch in turn made it difficult 
for future development planning. This dependence can be alleviated to 
-;omr ex tent bv di vr.r i fv i ~r the cconcny , h nee th· mph a is on the qro\<1th 
of the manuf clurin~J sector . 
. ·- ---------- 










Tax incentives were the first measures taken by the Federation of 
Malaya for the stimulation of industrial development~ Initially fiscal 
incentives we re opposed by the \forld Bank Mission which recommended, that 
more effective.incentives for industrial development were tariff protection 
and depreciation allowances .. In contrast, the government's Industrial 
Development Working Party came out in favour of tax concessio~sfor pioneer 
companies. However it could be argued that both partiei recommendations 
to stimulate industrial growth were no t s ubs t.ant i a t.e d by any empirical 
evidence. 
Malaysia's development strategy was not exclusively biased to the urban 
sector only. Both rural and urban sectors were eaually emphasised under 
government developmerit planning. A balanced development strategy should 
make it relatively easier for government to inte~rate the agricultural . . . 
sector with the industrial growth, by providing further linkages between 
these sectors. 
The first major piece of legislation was enacted July 31 1958 in 
order to accelerate the overall industrialisation by way of relief from 
income tax. This measure was known as the Pioneer Industries Ordinance 
1958 (PIO). Similar measures already ex"isted in many developing countries, 
such as Barbados , Philippines, Gold Coast, Singapore, Jamaica and 
lll9crit1.1 
Pioneer status was only granted to the manufacturing companies under 
cer t a in conditions as follows, 
(l)11lh given indus try crt hcr do not exist or on lv produces on a 
s ca l c no u i L IJ1 for the economic or development rcqu i r merits 
of Lh r dcr: t i on of M l, ya. 
(?)The prorri cts for the futur pot nt i a] f the q ivcn industry or 
f 11vourab l . 
(J)T11c qiv.n muus trv i ccns idcr d to b xn di nt wi th r pct to 
.• __ LIH' puh l ir; in .l'C0)t ,nd hou lr' th.1 fr. be as: i l. l."2 
I ... llcport ~f Inrlu -Lri l 0-.-v. I p111 nt \,I rkin roi ty, 19 7, /\pp. x . 










Once the above conditions were fulfilled and the production of the 
companies had begun, the companies were eligible to apply for pioneer 
status. The length of tax exemption under Pioneer Status in .1958 
ranged from 2 to 5 years dependent on the amount of initial fixed capital 
expenditure. A summarised provision of Pioneer Status 1958 or Pioneer 
Industries Ordinance 1958 can be seen in diagram I. 
Diagram I - Pioneer Ordinance 1958 (A Summary) 
Pioneer Status+ tax holiday+ fixed capital investment 
M$ 40G,OOO 2 years 
M$ 100,000 249,000 3-years 
M$ 250,000 5 years 
f 
Source: Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDI\), Kuala Lumpur. 
Fiscal incentives, attracted a large number of especially foreign 
investors and subsequently the number of pioneer certificates issued 
increased rapidly. However by the mid 1960s it was felt that PIO 1958 . . 
provided too generous incentives, especially since the majority of firms· 
which qua l i f i ed were granted the maximum period of tax exemption. In 
1965, therefore, Pioneer Industries Ordinance 1958 was accordingly 
revised, the main change being an upward revision of the fixed capital 
rcnuir om nt , thus tax e xemp t i ons were still a direct·function of ·initial 
fi .d cnp i ta] of the companies. The detailed provision of Pioneer Status 










Oi~~ra~ ~Pioneer Industries Ordinance 1965 (A Summary) 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance + tax holiday + capital investment 
<M$ 250,000 - 2 years 
M$ 250,000 499,999-3 years 
M$ 500,000 - 999,999-4 years 
M$1 ,000,000- 5 years 
Source: Fede~al Industrial Development Authority (FIDA),Kuala Lumpur. 
In Chapter 2, it was noted that one of the disappointing facets of 
early industrial growth was its uneven distribution, especially the 
concentration in the +ew developed states. The situation was further 
exacerbated by the initial government industrial policy, since the 
provision of Pioneer Status or Pioneer Industries,Ordinance 1958-1965 
.. 
did not emphasise the need for regional development in the less developed 
states. Even industrial estates, ~erhaps one of the. more effective 
measures to attain regional industrial dispersion, were initially 
cs tebl i s hed in the developed states. Although wi th the infrastructural 
prerequisites already existing in the developed states it is understandable 
why the mJjority of industries gravitated around such c~ntres. 
The first industrial estates were established in early 1962 in the 
states of Penang (Muk Mandin), Perak-Tasek, Johore-Larkin and Tampoi. 
In e second phase industrial estates were established in 1966 in the states 
or ScLn9or - Shah Alam (formerly called Batu Tiga) and Negeri Sembilan 
(Semu1·1i1n9). By 1967, there ·is a close correlation between industrial 
c~ a cs , rid the main high income states. However by 1971 some prcqres s 
Is eppercnt in the establishment of industrial estates in tile less 
c rHJr~ .d area par t i ul ar ly in the s d vclop cl tat Th lat r 
ill development i xami n din t i on 11 of 










Industrial estates offered completed developed sites with utilities, 
good transportation systems and a long-term lease with a land title. 
Hence it was considerably cheaper for the manufacturer to set up their 
establishments in industrial estates than elsewhere. 
At independence the institutional infrastructure was mainly geared 
1 to commerce and trade. However with the introduction of an industrial 
development programme it was necessary to establish government organisation. 
to cater more specifically to the needs of industry. In 1958 the 
Development Fund Ordinance wes introduced to raise funds for all forms 
of infrastructural facilities including the purchase of industrial sites. 
For instance, in the period of 1956-60 the government spent M$ 11 
nillion· on industrial sites but most of this expenditure was located 
In. Petaling Jaya. Under Second Malaya Plan fJ961-1965) about 
• 11$ 7.5 million were allocated to all levels for the similar purpose.1 
Malaysia Industrial Development Finance Ltd.,(MIDF) was formed in 
1960 which marked another important institution for financing the 
pr ive te sector. This institution had an initial capital pr ov i s i on of 
S 15 million in 1960 and by August 1962 the fund was further raised 
to 11S 50 million .. MIDFsspecific purpose \:1as to assist both local and foreign 
Investors to accelerate the development of manufacturing activities in 
accordance w i th government objectives. MIDF facilities included, 
rdiurn to lonu-tcrm Ioans , pur chas inq equity, fulfilling unccrwr+t tnq 
~ rviccs , xtcnding ver ious other services in connection vii th and 
, ~c ino up pro uction Ia ci l i t ie . Early criticism of the MIDF re l a ted 
l. lntr.rn, i ona l n, nk fat r. ons truc t i on nnd Dev lorm nt (I!3RD) R por t l 63 
· r!t·portonthc- .con-om1 c-"5'" 1). ·~f a -,y-i t )V t mi-. -rono-r-thc-IB :d-- 












to its bias toward large-scale investors(mainly foreign). This largely 
derived from the MIDF'~ preoccupation with profits which unfortunately 
discriminated against the smaller locally owned enterprises. Such 
criticisms fi~ally led to reorganisation of MIDF which paid more 
~ttention to the small scale establishment rather than large scale 
cs tab l i s hm en t. 
Malaysian Industrial Estate Ltd., (MIEL) was set up in 1960 with 
the main aim to reduce the complication in setting up a new factory on 
an industrial estate in Malaysia. Malaysian Industrial Estate Ltd., 
(M!EL) is a subsidiary of Malaysia Industrial Development Finance Ltd.,· 
(M!DF) v1hich offered 
ttstandardised factory units or complete, made to order production 
facilities, which could either be leased or purchased at 
reasonable pr i ces ."] ' 
I ,,/ 
l' ,. l 
·' 
( ' I. 
O~viously, MIEL was more biased toward the .l arqe scale establishment but 
t hi s s i tu a t i on w a s co u n t e r b a 1 a n c e d by a s s i s t i n g the s m a 11 - s c a l e i n du s tr i es 
w~lch included handicrafts industry etc. since such industries generally 
"t!rc less able to raise capital through orthodox methods. 
In the period of early 1960s, there was not much progress of 
lndustriill development partly because of lack of coordination between 
1rncics engaged in industrial growth. Such criticism was aired in the 
P11dr Rr.port2 vhi ch proposed the establishment of aneutononous public 
ln!luilrit~l ogcncy in order to lessen the complaints of bureaucratic 
lnrplll11rlc. This autonomous body known as Fcdcrn l Industrial Development 
'' hor i ty (r:IOA) 1i10c created in 1965. Its main task was to carry out 
prrY.ot.lon;il act iv: ti c both. a t hom and abrcnc , Lo und rt ak inclu tr i l 
'''1l',lh'1ity tudi es , to rcconm ncl th s tab l i hm nt of indu trill i tc .. 
"·'n :1pincnq r - Rcq i ona] fndur;Lriuli at ton Po l i c i <; in 1 ma l l 
"''"'011.i:1q _ _sou2.1t ,v, A ,1·; .;l.ucryc)f ~I s t Mt1l1yTi-, -, ·1 ,, , loo, p.~~. 
~,,.,. •1'. int.r.rpr<~t.rl by D. p i nanqc r , Rcq i on: 1 l ndus tr it l i s: Lion Polici s 










and process the pioneer status applications. It was, in addition, to 
be responsible for the coordination of industrial development 
activities. FIDA also performed special tasks such as making recommendatiorr:; 
to the Minister of Trade and Industry on industrial growth issues. 
These functions were performed only after 1967 because of the slow. 
response from the government. This feature was understandable since in 
the early formation of FIDA as noted ~Y Heinz Rudolph (1970) ·was made 
difficult by the lack of trained Malays, although the skilled expertise 
of other races already existed. 1 
Tariff protection forms another important pillar of the government's 
industrial development strategy, although initially tariffs were mainly 
used to qener-a t e revenue rather than as protective devices. For instance, 
the import duty revenue co 11 ected from motor vr.h~ c 1 es wh i ch at that 
ti~c ~ere not produced locally, was increasing almost do~ble in their 
thMe of tote l import duty revenue· i.e. from 10. Pl, in 1954 to 
2 
17.r.:-1956.0ther similar examples suggest that Malaysia in its early 
PhJsc of industrialisation placed less emphasis on tariff protection 
th~n milny other developing countries. The policy of tariff protection 
~s advocated by the World Bank Mission ~s a means for stimulation of 
lndustrL1l development was implemented only slowly. This is explained 
by several factors which included the following: First, the increase 
( ex i s t inq tariffsmight have led to reduced imports and thus deprived 
lie ~ovcrnmcnt0f revenue.Second, being a colony until 1957, it was not 
h I e t o p u rs u c i'I n i n cl o pc n d e n t t r a d c p o l i c y a s i t w a s f i rm l y t i e d to t h e 
Cllr"Mo11110,1lth y tern .. Third, it wa f ar od hat tariff protection 
f vour d the urban Chinese at the expense of the poor Mc lays. This 
I. S~e .1]<;0 0. Sp inanq r , 
fkvr_l 01~i_nCJ _Country, f\ 
l. 
Rr.qional l ndus t r i: li a t i on r I i c i s in il Small 
11 •• s tu l.v o \le l 111Cli:-1c, '1 -. -91To:pin-:-(f" 
I.. 11orr111.1nn t IHI T1 n .)i VJ 1·., lnclur;Lri;1l d'Ol'/t.h rmploym nL In I F{ , .. i9n 
lnv1•,t.111c11L in I' ninsul: r M,1ii:ri1, Oxford Univ-1' Hy! 1· s--1900-:--· 










would have intensified ~acial tension, as the .income distribution was 
already unequal. Fourth, under free ·trade policy, there was a strong 
opposition from plantation, mining and commercial sectors where input prices 
voul d be increased by tariff. This was especially so from the more 
increased the cost of living~ which in turn would increase the demand for 
labour intensive industries such as rubber where. tariffs would have 
higher waqe s , Lastly, the Working Party initially favoured tax incentives 
and was reluctant to use tariffs for a protective purpose. 
However a tariff protection institution came into existence in 1959 
I 
"hen the Tariff Advisory Committee (TAC) was established. Despite the 
establishment of TAC tariffs as instruments for protective purposes were 
underutilised, since TAC was fairly inactive as an institution. Only 
a fc1·1 pioneer industries were granted tariff prO't:ection and most of TAC 
actions were influenced by revenue consideration. In fact by 1962 TAC 
I actually abolished a number of tariffs. ! I 
Under Tariff Advisory Goard (TAG) Act in 1963, TAG was subsequently 
fully constituted and this turning point marked the end of tariff 
nolicy for revenue purposes t~ one for protective measures. Therefore, 
f'\'l~n hcfore 19G8,Mulaysia'stariff policy changed from tariff making for 
revenue purposes to active protection. The impact of tariff protection 
"Ill be ana lys cd under Chapter 4. 
To sum up, the general trend of government industrial strategy before 
1? 0 w,1 mo in ly to ma i nt a i n a favouruhle investment c l tmate by providing 
Inc ntiv s , i ndus tr i a l estat s and oth r industrial infrustructure 
1uch J~fin<nciJl in titutionri.f\fter 19G8 the role of indig ncou p op lcs 
·(I cl11dcd Millay) via incrca in ly importt1nt in inf lu n in the gov rnm nt's l I 
\rdu\ r ia ] s tra t <Jy. Th1' n tr t ny n t 11 l t l u .vJ · 1 :; W<.) v nun y nctpsu l\ c 










II. Period of Increased Government Industrial Policies Activity from 
1968 
Fiscal Incentives 
Under the Pioneer Industries Ordinance (PIO) 1958, the number of 
pioneer companies increas.ed from 18 in 1959 to 246 in 1971. Although 
the number of pioneer companies appeared small, they contributed a 
considerable share to the manufacturing value added, employment and 
output. A disappointing facet of the large scale establishment 
attracted by PIO was its highly capital intensive nature and its 
inappropriate technology in relation to the problem of unemployment .. 
This particular situation, existed only in the initial stage of 
industrial growth particularly before mid 1970's. 
In 1968 the government enacted a Pioneer Industries Ordinance PIO 
f 
(1968) wh ich marked a turning point in government" industrial strategy. 
Although the 1968 Act itself did not introduce dramatic ~hange, some 
of its minor changes later became mo~e significant in government policy. 
The basic concept of promotional incentives remained unchanged, i.e. 
the length of exemption was a direct function of capital investment. 
This is shown in diagram 3. 
p~~rum 3 - Tax Holiday as a Direct Function on Amount of Initial Fixed 
Capit<ll Exoenditure of a Company. 
x .: I 
l)lll)('r or y ar X.3 
I '' ho l inay 
J j I J 1 J) j If 










As shown in the above diagrams, as the initial amount of fixed 
c~pital expenditure increases so does the length of tax holidays granted. 
"For instance a company investing y1 amount of initial fixed capital 
expenditure, is granted x1 tax holiday .. If a company has a larger fixed 
lniti~l capital expenditure for instance from y1 to y2,the tax holiday 
granted also increases from x1 to x2. 
The 1968 Act did however incorporate changes which widened its 
scope. Commercial enterprises as well as manufacturing firms became 
1 eligible for pioneer industry consideration. Furthermore it also granted, 
an additional tax holiday up to 3 years under certain conditions, as 
follows, (1) if an industrial establishment set up in a specific deyelopment 
1 area. (2) used a specified local content and (3) on production of 
'priority' product. This provision is sumnar i s cd under diagram 4. 
Ola0ram 4 - Provision Pioneer Status (PS) 1968 (A Summary) 





less than $250,000 - 2 years 
not less than $250,000 - 3 years 
not 1 ess than $500,000 - 4 years 
not 1 ess than $1000,000- 5 years 
additional 
year 
+ (a) Development area 
(b) Priority Products 
(c) Specified Local Content 
Source: FIOA,Kuala Lumpur. 
Prov i t i on of Pion r Indu tri Or d i nancc 1968 1vn ubs qu nt ly 
"ided aaain in 1071 known as Invcs unont Inc ntiv Act vll1ich app l icd 










This was in response to increasing demand for hotels and the desire to 
stimulate the tourist industry. The 1971.Act may be seenasastrategy 
to broaden and diversify the economy although its methods are not without 
criticism and these are examined more closely in Chapter 4. 
A further ~hange in fiscal policies is seen under Investment Incentive 
Amendment Act in October 1971 formulated to attract mainly the electronics 
I 
industry. This piece of legislation revealed the governmen~attempt to 
reap spin-off ·benefits from the increased demand for electronics 
components in the world market. As f~r as Mala.vsia was concerned in the 
ea r l y l 9 7 0 ' s it w a s i n a 11 o s i t i on of c om pa r a t i v e a d v a n ta g e s i n c e it h ad 
~· . 
an abundant supply .of cheap labour. To reap this benefit, Malaysian 
industrial strategy formulated a 'special investment incentives' which 
granted privileges up to a maximum of 10 years. 'This incentive was aimed 
to encourage foreign investors to set up their labour intensive 
establishments in Malaysia rather than other countries. The generous 
package of incentives for electronic assembly industries was to persuade 
foreign investors in other countries, to invest in Malaysia. For 
instance in 1973 there was a large-scale movement to .Malaysia from Singapore 
of electronic assembly firms partly in response to Malaysia's off~r of 
10 yea~s tax exemptions for foreign enterprises which exported their 
munufactured products. Th~se footloose industries not only exacerbated 
the regional imbalances since they mostly set up in the West Coa~t of Peninsula 
Malay ia but they also paid very low wages which were below the national 
1ncome per capita.1 This vri l ] be examined further in Chapter 4 and 5. 
In 1971, a Labour Utilisation Relief (LUR) was introduced in order 
to counterbalance the bias toward capital-intensive establishments. Under 
1. ·cc''Mrnanr.d Industriali at i on a l Polici in Malaysia 
- 07.il.Y M hmc t , Th uth East vi \-11 Vol. I. No.3, 










LUR provi~ion a qualified company can be granted tax exemption for a 
period of 2 to 5 years if it employs a specific number of full-time 
employees. The schedules ranges from 2 years for 51-100 employees and 
up to five years for a company employing 351 full time employees or 
more. Additional years can be granted if the company fulfils other 
specific conditions. LUR provisions are shown in diagram 5 below. 
Diagram 5 - LUR Provision (A Summary) 






51 - 100 employees 
100- 200 employees 
2 years 
3 years 
201- 350 employees 4 years 
351 and abo1e emplovees -.5 years. 
additional year+ (1) Development area 
(2) Priority products 
(3) Specified low content 
Source: FIDA, Kuala Lumpur. 
LUR provision marked. a turnin~ point, to the basic concept that exemption 
. . 
depended on the amount of fixed carital expenditure. How far this 
provision is effective to attract labour-intensive industries will also 
b cxami ncd in Chu ptcr 4. 
In addi t i on to the above fiscal incentives, another type of tax 
1nccntivc vas formulated under Investment Incentive /\ct 1971. This 
inccnt iv is knovm as Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and c( n be qr ant d to 
conpani ,. v1hi h cl not qua l i fy for pion r s t a tu but wh c tab l i shm nt 










not less than 25% of capital expenditure .incurred on factory, plant or 
machinery for an approved project. The ITC will be increa~ed by 
additional 5% if the following condition are fulfilled by a company; 
"(l) if the factory is in a development area. 
(2) if it attains the required percentage of Malavsian content. 
( 3) if it produces a priority product . 11 l 
A summary of Investment Tax Credit (ITC) provision can be seen in 
diagram 6. It appears that ITC provisions are favourable for projects with 
heavy investments and long gestation period before profits are made. 
In the late 1960s the Malaysian government became increasin~ly 
concerned that industrial strategy should not be dependent on import- 
substitution industrialisation (ISi) only,but that export led growth strategy 
should be encouraged further. One of the measures to promote export 
f 
expansion was a set of fiscal incentives known as expcr t incentives enacted 
under tbe Investment Incentive Act 1968. There were three types· of 
export incentives which included the following. 
(1) Accelerated Depreciation Allowance (ADA) 
(2) Double Deduction for Promotion Overseas. 
(3) Export Allowances. The summarised provision of export incentives 
arc shovn in diagram 7. 
Regional imbalances have led to rural-urban migration which is 
another chollenging problem t6 political stability. ·In order to redress 
U1' e rcq i ona l imba Iances Locational ·Incentives (LC) wer e formulated in 
1973. Ini t i a l lv this package .of i nccnt ive's did not specifically state 
tho Ir. iJnilt d ar .il under LC provi ion. Inst od th Minister of Trade· 
and Industry had the power to 011011 him to srccify th nrcas , as well as 
l. l nvcs tm nt Tax Cr d i t (ITC) Provision - Inv Act 










the length of tax exemption and dateline for the application. The 
su~narised provision of Locational Incentive are shown in diagram 8. 




Amount not less than 25% of capital expenditure 
incurred on factory, plant or machinery for 
approved project. 
Additional 5%~ ( l ) Development Area 
(2) Priority Prqducts 
(3) Specified Lotal Content. 
f 
Tax relief equal amount to credit,and credit can 
>- be carried forward in case of lass or i nsuffi ci ency 
of income until fully utilised against subsequent 
profits. 
Source i FIDA, Kuala Lumpur , Malaysia 
It v1i1s not until 1977 that officially designated area were spr c if ica l ly 
r:cnlioncd. 
The o wcr c 
(1) K duh xclu li nq Ku, lil Mudu Di trict 
(2) rr1!11rn9 ex lud i nq Kuantan Oi t1 ict 
(3) K l ant.a n 
















Al l owance s 
_Expenses Qua l i fi~ 
(a) overseas advertising 
(b) supply of free s arnp les overseas 
(c) Export market research 
(d) Preparation of overseas tenders 
( e ) Su pp l y o f t e c h n i c a 1 i n form a t i on over s ea s 
(f) Public relations work connected with 
exports 
(g) Expenses directly contributable to the 
exhibits and participation required in 
trade or industrial exhibitions aooroved 
by the Minister of Trade and Ind~~~ry 
(h) Fares in r esne c t of travel overseas bv 
employees of companies for business 
(i) Accommodation a.rid sustenances expenses incurred 
by Malaysian business men going overseas for 
business subject to $100/- per day. 
(j) Cost of manufacturing sales offices overseas for 
the promotion of exports. 
Only resident companies qualified 
Must export 20% by value ... 
Given only in ~~spect of. capital expenditure incurred 
on modernisation 
rate 40% per annum 
Export Allowance~ Formula used 
(i) for a ~ompany which is already exporting 
(a ): x x 2% 
plus (b) (x-y) x 10% 
(ii) for a company which is exporting for the first time 
x x 12% 
x =exports in th~ basis period 
y =export of the year in which the company was last 











Diagram 8. - Provision of Locational Incentive (A Summary) 
tmployment 
less than 101 emp l ovees 5 years 
101 200 employees 6 years 
Loe at i ona 1 201 - 350 employees 7 years Incentive 
351 - above employees - 8. years 
tax holiday capital investment 
less.than $250,000 5 years 
not less than $250,000 6 years 
not less than $500;000 




' .. .. 
Additional Year 
(a) Priority Products 
(b) Specified Local Contents 
-} Divi·dends - Dividends paid out of tax free profits by 
shareholding companies to shareholders, 
where shareholder is a company, are exempt 
from tax in hands of the shareholder .. 
~ Capital investment+ Capital expenditure on existing 
assets deemed to have been incurred on 
day following end of tax relief period. 
and capital allowances calculated 
accordingly. , 
-) Lo c where lossc have been incurred during 
the tux r l i cf pcri od, the net amoqnt 
of such losses con be cnrricd forw rd and 












(8) Johore Tenggara Area 
The distribution of Locational Incentive is also seen in map II. 
Overall, fiscal incentives were responsible in stimulating the growth 
of manufacturing production but they also had several shortcomings 
since the ~ackage of fiscal incentives had grown very rapidly and in a 
haohazard way.The impact of fiscal incentives on the manufacturing sector 
will be examined more clearly in Chapter 4. 
Tariffs 
As early as 1963 Malaysia still had a low level of tariff protectjon, 
and non .tariff barriers were also non-existent. However, by end of the 
' 1960~decade, tariff policy had changed from tarif~:making for revenue 
purposes to that of active protection. 
In order to speed up the function of tariff policy as a protective 
instrument a Capital Investment Committee (CIC) was set up in 1969. 
The Tariff Advisory Board was replaced by the Special Action Committee 
on tariff which served as a tariff unit operating within FIDA. This 
wus to stimulate the process of tariff protection. Conditions for 
increased tariff protection included, the output of a firm or its 
increment to production should sufficiently satisfy a given proportion 
of the domestic market. Usually in principle this proportion should 
he 80% but sometimes as little as 40% or 50% was accepted. If the above 
condition is fulfilled by the firm, the degree of protection is apparently 
ei1lculi1tr.d by ccnpar inq the cost of nroduction with the prices of impot ts. 
The dr.Dr e of tariff protection ill o took into account th future 
posr.ibility of dump i n or marainally pr i c d impor ts . Und r c r tn in 










production over the prices of imports. Under this case, permissible 
price is not related to the cost of imports or the price of eff~ciency 
but is only related to the cost of production plus an adequate return 
to the capital. Temporary quotas besides tariffsare also operated under 
the recommendation of FIDA. This protection is typically granted for 
6-9 months but in some cases it can be longer. This is to avoid 
stockniling by importers before the new tariff become effective and 
also assists the, local firms to get an easy start to. their production. 
In 1974, only 80 items imnorted, were under temporary quotas measure.1 
Industrial Estates 
As mentioned earlier, industrial estates were established mainly 
in the more developed states including Johore, Penang, Selangor and 
' Perak. No industrial estates \'/ere· set up before ·~970 in the Northern states 
of Trengganu, Kelantan, Perlis and Kedah. ·This indirectly exacerbated 
the problem of regional imbalances with heavy concentration on a few 
major developed states. Moreover industry was confined to a few major 
cities within the developed states. To counterbalance this, under 
Malaysian Industrial strategy, effort were made to increase the number 
of industrial estate establishments in less developed states. In the 
period of 1970 to 1974 the overall number of industrial estates 
increased from 8 to 44 and their area increased by 200% to 13, 995 
acres . Moreover the expansion of industrial estates in less developed 
stales especially No~thern States (Perl is, Kelantan, Trengganu and Kedah) 
also increased (see table 8.1). This was a positive approach to locate 
industrial estates in the 1css developed states and to redress region 1 









Distribution (Per cent) of • Share of 
t-'ercent 
Number of I Es Area of IEs(acres) changea (per 
cent) of IE 
eg n 
arPabused 
1970 1974 1977 >1977 1970 1974 1977 >1977 70-74 74-77 
1977- 1977 
. rt ern s·ates - 13.6 15. l 16. 2 - 7. (_ l 0. 3 15.5 l 0. 4 25.2 29.5 
65.9 
s uthern Stq.tes 25.0 36.4 34.0 31. l 9.6 
34.2 29.5 30.3 45. 1 7.2 32.6 73.8 
'.·!2s · ern States 75.0 50.0 50.9 52.7 90.4 58.6 60.2 
54.2 44.5 67-. 5 37.9 74.8 
•ale 8 44 53 74 4,301 13,995 16,928 23,118 
9,694 2,933 6'185 73.5d 
I 
I 
c - {change in IE area in region/total change in IE area) 100 - b - (Area sold in IEs/area saleable) 100 - c 
Ac~ual values d - Average utilization of IEs in West M~laysia. 
E Industrial Estate 
~ource: O. Spinanger - Regional Industrialisation Policies in a Small Developing Country, Kiel, 1980. 










regional imbalances is examined in Chapter 4. 
The development of industrial activitv in Malaysia has not been 
without any disappointing facet, including the identification of 
ethnicity with economic function. In Chapter 2 it was noted that the 
Malay wa s the poorest member of society and this partly.resulted in 
racial riots May 1969. These riots caused a fundamental change of 
strategy \~hich resulted in the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). · 
Under New Economic Policy (NEP), a new act known as the Industrial 
Coordination Act was legislated in May 1975 which was a principal 
legislative effort to direct the participation of 'bumiputra' (indigeneous 
peoples includ~d ethnic Malays)to control 30% of equity by 1990. The. 
imolementation of ICA in 1976 provoked strong criticism and led to .a 
f 
substantial decline iri investment activity particµlarly in the 
manufacturing sector. For instance, according to the Federal Industrial 
Development Authority (FIDA) Annual Report 1971 - 1977 the 
"level of approval in 1977 was only half as high as the peak 
level of 1974 and 40 per cent lower than the 1971 level .111 
The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) 1975 was unclear, ambiguous 
and aroused uncertainties amongst investors, since the act allowed the 
government to directly alter the employment and ownership structure of 
existing firms. Whilst the ICA Act 1975 was clearly responsible for a 
decline in investment due to the uncertainty it created, it can also 
be argued that some of the decline was in response to the slowing down ·of· 
Horld economic activity - a situation to which Malaysia is par-ti cu l ar ly 
vulnernb] c due to the opcncs s of its economy. 
The Malaysian government followed a pragmatic approacl1 by amending 










plenty of room for implementation to be flexible. For instance under 
the new act the Ma 1 ays i an government was quite harry to accept 100% foreign 
equity on sophisticated and export oriented enterprises. By adopting 
a pragmatic attitude the Malaysian government has dispelled many of the 
fears created by the 1975 "lCA Act. Despite the downturn in the world 
economy, Malaysia has continued to attract a considerable amount of 
investment both foreign and local, to continue its steady growth of the 
manufacturing sector and to further the objectives of New 
Economic Policy.1 As far as foreign investment is concerned a leading 
South East Asian bank appears optimistic as indicated by the Chairman 
of the Hong ·Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
"I do not think Malaysia needs to be wor r ied about foreign 
investment" and Dr. Mahathir also said; "Investors know there 
is a great potential for a steel mill to ~erve the domestic and 
export markets. Many of them are keen to 'come not only to build 
a steel mill for us but to participate in its equity. With so 
manv interested parties, 1·1e can pick ·and choose who vie '-'rnnt to 
·invest in our country, whereas we did not have this option 
before."2 · 
The political and economic stability of Malaysia is also a 
significunt factor in ensuring a steady flow of investment and therefore 
l. The overriding objective of the fffP adopted in 1971 is to achieve 
nat i ona l unity through a t\'JO-pronged development strutegy of: 
(l)eradicating poverty by raising the income levels and increasing the 
employment opportunities for all Malaysian irrespective of race and 
(2)restructuring society as to reduce the economic imbalances that 
exist among the various races in Malaysia and to eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic functions." 
See Third Malaysia Plan 1976 - ·1980, Malaysia Government Publication. 
2. Article on "tho ri qht to choose investors" from our Special. 
Cort'espondcnt.Cr:iuntr~ Perspective Maluysia ,·Malaysia Government 











manufacturing development.- For instance foreign investors do not fear 
nationalisation and Malaysia has a good reputation for honesty and 
lJck of corruption. 
This chapter has outlined major changes in industrial development 
policy since independence in 1957.~ The next Ch~pter looks more closely 




















THE IMPACT OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ON THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
IN MALAYSIA 
The major industrial policies in Malaysia are tariffs, fiscal 
incentives and industrial estates. The two main pillars on which 
Malaysian industrial strategy is based are tariffs and fiscal incentives. 
These two instruments have been used to stimulate the growth of 
manufacturing sector, even though there has been considerable controversy 
in regard to their effectiveness. Nevertheless, tariffs ahd fiscal 
incentives were equally used in Malaysian industrial strategy in 
order to hasten the development of manufacturing activity. Another major 
problem in the development of industrial activities in Malaysia was the 
concentration of activity in a few developed states. One of the difficult 
' tasks of industrial planning is to direct industrial activity into less 
developed states thus 0iming to redress uneven regional development. To 
achieve this aim, industrial estates were used as an instrument of 
regional development. This chapter, assesses some of the impact of these 
major industrial policies, particularly fiscal incentives, tariff 
protection and industrial estates. 
Section I - Fiscal Incentives 
In the previous cl1apter, it was noted that since 1970, government 
industrial strategies stressed the need for export orientation rather 
than import substitution. This was partly because import - substitution 
opportuni·tics were becoming exhausted and export -·led growth was 
ncccss~ry to sustain further industrial growth. Efforts to gear the 
manufacturing sector toward export orientation were seriously considered 
only after 1960 with the launching of the Investment Inc ntivc Act 1968. 










orientation only became effective in the 1970's decade, correspondingly 
export expansion of manufactur~d goods increased from- 11% of GDP in 1970 to 
21~~ in 1980. (This is s hown in Table 2.7, Chapter 2). The relatively good. 
to the government'sindustrial ·policies including fiscal policies. 
I 
l I . 
j 
rerformance of the manufacturing export sector was partly attributed 
Fiscal incentives include the double deduction of export promotional 
measures which range from overseas advertising, supply of free sample 
overseas, export market research, preparation of overseas tenders, supply 
of technical inf0rmation overseas, public relationswork connected with 
export and accelerated depreciation allowance (ADA). These fiscal 
incentives form part of the government's industrial strategies to 
accelerate the' growth of manufacturing activities. 
Although there are many factors, fiscal in~ntives are a main factor 
responsible f~r the grmwth ~f manufacturing expo~~ s~ctor in Malaysia and 
indeed other newly industrialising countries such as Singapore. 
According to one researcher, 
"while many factors are responsible for the spectacular growth 
of Singapore's rnanufactuiing industry, tax in~entives must be 
considered one of them". 
However Hoffmann argues that tax incentives were redundant in the 
sense that they did little to influence investment activit~ Such an 
argument is clearly stated by Hoffmann, 
"the empirical evidence is that tax incentives are largely 
redundant .... "and he further proceeded and concluded that, 
"in the light of this it is rather surorisinq that in the 
ll[X it wus the smaller rather than the larger firms which 
considered tax incentives as important for their export· 
activity. It could well be that the large companies did not 
con~idcr that the incentives had a decisive influence on their 
octivity but nevertheless reaped their benefits,112 
I. ~·.~aFong, ~t:r_o1:!:9:1 of E_c_q_n'.)l'l_ic Development in Singnpore(Singnpore 1970" 
2. L. lloffnwnn and Tan Si ,,, Ee, Indus tr i a l Grm-1th, Emplo.vment and Foreign 









. . , 
It could be argued thatHoffmanns·analysis to prove tax incentives'. 
as ineffective is questionable. This is because some of the evidence, 
and to some extent Hoffmann's empirical evidence as shown in table 4.1 
can be used to show that tax incentives have played a positive role to 
determine investment activity in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. • 
Based on table 4.1 in general the percentage of total approved companiek. 
't 
under tax incentives gradually decreased in time, whilst non-incentives 
approved companies gained in importance especially in 1974. Hoffmann 
stresses that the incentives through acquired time, played little role to 
determine investment activity. However it could be argued that through 
acquired time, it is understandable that many approved companies should 
not be granted concessions since they are in position to survive under· marke 
competition. As many approved companies are not,granted incentives at 
the later. s ta qe of their operation this will tncrease , the . , 
percentage of the total companies without incentives. For instance, 
from table 4.1 (from Hoffmann'ssource) the percentage of approved companies 
without incentives increased from 14% in 1969 to 58% in 1974. 
In addition, based on the same table 4.1, a~ early as 1969 more than 
80% of approved companies were granted pioneer status. The contribution 
of pioneer establishmentsto manufucturing output , value added and fixed 
capital stock was significant1 for instance, the pioneer establishments 
in 1968 generated more than 29% of the total share of manufacturing· 
v~lu add d, output and fixed capital expenditure. The considerable 
contribution of pi oncer establishment to the share of the inanufacturing sec to 
1·111 Pilrtly t tr tbut.or: to pion er to tus policy. Therefore it is an 
undeniul)l f ct th t fi c 1 incentives played e role to hasten the qrowth 









of manufacturing activity. In other words it can be argued that Hoffmann 
totally misinterprets the value or purpose of tax incentives i.e. if 
they are designed to initiate industrial development and are successful 
Table 4.1 Percentage Distribution of Number and Proposed Called-up 
Capital of all approved Firms 
Pioneer Investment· LUR · Other No YEAR Status Tax Credit Incentivesb Incentives 
No. Capital No. Capital No. Can1tal No. Cap i t a l No. Capital 
1969 83 92 3 3 0 0 0 0 14 ·5 
1970 52 70 9 12 0 0 1 0 38 18 
1971 48 54 7 19 0 0 6 17 39 10 
1972 45 69 3 11 2 3 2 1 48 16 
1973 38 69 5 9 4 2 3 2 50 18 
1974 32 60 6 13 3 1 1 1 58 25 
~ 
(in Per Cent)a 
N.B.: a - Figures add up horizontally to 100 for No. and Capital 
respectively 
b - Includes accelerated depreciation allowances 
LUR = Labour Utilization Relief 
Sauce: L. Hoffmann, T.S. Ee - Industrial Growth, Emplovment and Foreign 
Investment in Peninsular Malaysi~, Oxford University Press 1980. 
Table III,6, pg. 49. 
in so doin , then they will no longer be required and therefore should 
b xp c cd ob c me redundant. 
But , how f r ar ox incentives the most effective instruments to 
oc . mine inv. 1 m nt , ~ t i'v ily? This ti 11 (JU ti nab l inc .o x 
· i nccn i VC" r no the only s inc 1 . in Ju tri in rum n de .rmi n 
inv s men uC iv i ly. Thi is b C< 11 ·11 r mnj r fnc or ~uch u 









contributed positively in determining investment a c t iv i tv but such 
factors are d i ff i cu 1t to qua n ti fy . Never the 1 es s , tax i n cent i v es can be 
a complementary instrument to hasten and detennine the pattern of 
industrial activity. 
"The impact of certain fiscal po l i c i esIhas been considered as 
undesirable by some observers. In particular the Special Incentives for 
Export Orientated Industries. This incentive was especially designed to 
attract both labour intensive and export oriented industries. By 1973, 
Malaysia was successful in attracting these industries as seen from the 
large-scale movement, mainly electronic assembly industries, from 
... 
Singapore.8esides, electronic assembly industries, other export 
manufacturers equally as important were textiles and clothing. These 
incentives generated a substantial increase in ma~ufacturing's share 
of Gross Domestic Product {GDP), from 16:4% in 1975 to 19.8% in 1978. 
More significantly these ind~stries also ac~ounted for almost one 
Table 4.2 - Total Employment" Share in Se l ec ted Manufactur~ng Industries· 
1973(June) 1979(June) 
Industry (No.) as -% (No.) as% 
Employees of total Employees of total 
Electronics 12,316 7.7 65,949 22.3 
Textiles 17,425 10.9 34,533 11. 7 
Clothing 7,8~6 4.9 16 I 307 5.5 
Toto la 37,587 23.5 116,789 39.5 
Tot, 1 
M nuf. ct- 159,259 100.0 296,378 100.0 
urinq 
- tot 1 of th hr s 1 ct d indu tri 
Source: Computed from Ozay Mch111ct1 MJnflg d 
R.Jr ss 1 Polici sin M lt.'ri,, !\,;.;...inn Economic R -- Vol. 1, No.3, 1900, p.225, T bl II I. 











third of aggregate output growth in the entire economy. 
The growth of export - oriented industries based on cheap labour 
generated a considerable employment share in the manufacturing 
sector. Tahle 4.2 indicates that 40% of total employment in the 
manufacturing sector was contributed by electronics, textiles and clothing 
industries. These industries were attracted to set ur their branch-plants 
in Malaysia mainly in response to government industrial'policies 
especially the Special Incentives which granted up to a maximum ten years 
of tax· holiday are unfortunately 'footloose' industries. As their 
name implies these industries seek out countries with the most generous 
tax incentives and cheap labour availability, and are prepared to move 
on after.taking advantage of such conditions. 1~ the 1980s Malaysia's 
comparative advantage in cheap labour is gradually being eroded and 
there are signs that these footloose industri~s might be moving to other. 
d 
I . 
eveloping country such as Thailand &Sri Lanka which have large supplies, 
of cheap labour and generous packages of tax incentives. This is 
suggested by Ozay Mehmet, 
"Some years ogo, they wer e dominant in Singapore but economic 
gr0\·1th and land shortage there have forced the Singaporean 
authorities to become increasingly selective and dependent on 
1,bour-saving high-technology. Malaysia has reaped some spin- 
vcr encfits from this, but now there are signs that these 
firms are moving into Thailand and Sri Lanka and other sources 
of h p l a bo 1 r . 11 1 
Hm1 fr d Sp c t a ' Inc ntivcs effectively fulfil some of the 
<over men ' ton rrow the gap of income inequulity.and to 
unli t l i v i nc e , ml rds or o i ty Lhr u9h kill-tr i n i nr nd m n- ewer 
1 . nlPv.ryl ells. l Po l i c i 










development? In order to assess the above government objectives, it is 
necessary to examine some of the.footloose industries' features. One·featur~ 
l 
is that they do not require many skilled workers since the manning of 
automated machines and assembly 'line operation; in electronic - assembly 
industr1es can be easily done by any workers with little or no 
educational qualification. Hence, these footloose industries arc not 
good agents of technology transfer since it is not necessary for them 
to invest in skill-training and man-power development. This aspect may 
be seen as inconsistent viith the government's aspirations to modernise 
and restructure the economy and society in Malaysia. 
Although labour productivity in these footloose industries is high, 
wor ke r s in these industries are lowly paid and the majority earn "a 
monthly income well below the averag~ national i~come per capita of 
M.S2 l 7 per month111• Th; s evidence suqqes ts that f oat loose i ndus tries 
are not successful as an agent to uplift the ·living standards of a poor 
society which is trapped in a vicious circle of poverty. In the past, 
rapid urbanisation in Malaysia has been accompanied by the considerable 
growth of slum and sq~atter-areas. This is a sign of increasing net 
social costs, as the growth of footloo~e industry is inconsistent with 
government objectives. In addition as observed by one researcher i.e .. 
".v t · he 
finuin 
\·J01•k. r 
lee ronics factories especially have trouble 
vor+crs and the l ar qes t factory has to attract its 
from ov r a wide area, even from the state of Kelantan112 
\·Jilli Lh is vidcncc there is a need to have new industrial policies 
whi ch no nly im o l)rOiHI nth industrial bus but al o up l i.t t th 
s Lt nd r of 1 i vi ng i\mong h poor by n rrov1in9 the i ncom in qua l i 9l\p. 
1. Ozn M0.lrn1·, u'l r ie l : l1 ion and Pov rly r drcs ul Po l ic t 
in M, 1 y i , r, A1i1 n conornic I~ v icw , p .. 2G. -- ---- -- ----- . 
2. Anton Vtn N rs n, ion actor« 1nd l.inkl~JC , t h indu rial 
. tc LI of M lace: Tovm. R ~ ( rch lot s ( n I Discus ion rq)Cr No., , 










It is also worth assessing the impact of Labour Utilization Relief 
(LUR) which is especially aimed to attract labour-intensive industries. 
labour-intensive industries were especially appropriate before the 
1980's decade because of unemp loyment orob lens emonqs t the unskilled 
workers. From table 4.3 only~ few approved companies were granted . . 
privileges under Labour Utilization Relief (LUR) incentives. In fact, 
over a period of time, as seen in table 4.3 the percentage of approved 
companies under LUR incentive were decreased. For instance, in 1972 total 
approved companies under LlJR incentive were 9% but by 1976.only 7% of 
total approved companies came under this incentive. 
At the first glance, LUR incentives are different from other fiscal 
Table 4.3 - Percentage of Total Approved Companies under LUR Incentive 
from 1972-1976. 
' 
YEAR 1972 1973 1976 
No. of approved companies 355 473 425 
No. of companies granted 
LUR (percenta9e) 9 17 7 
No. of total authorised 
Capital (percentage) 2 2.7 0.6 
Source: extracted from Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) 
R por s 1972, 1973 and 1976. 
inccn iv such s Pioneer Status (PS), Investment Tax Credit (ITC), 
Ace l r .cd n pr ci ion Allovi nee (f\Df\) and Special Incentive (SI). 
Gcncrt lly, h. l nn h of tax holid yin mot fiscal incentives ·1'5 
rlcpcn I nt on he mount of ini Li< 1 fix d npil1 l xp ndi ur of n company. 
II nc , tax holiiily is ircct f met ton of h mount f ini t t: 1 fix d 
Cilpit11 Ii f. l xp n . ·u o a comn1ny. n 
depend nt on Lh. number's of full tim \ti rk r 









fixed capital expenditure of a company. This is demonstrated in diagram 
and I I . 
58 
Labour Utilization Relief (LUR) incentives are supposed not to be 
Diagram I 
Tax holiday is a direct function of the amount of initial fixed caoital 
expenditure 
- Accelerated Depreciation Allowance, Pioneer Status, Investment Tax 




amount of initial fixed capital expenditure 
in a company. 
Qj__agram I I 
Tax h lid~y is not o direct function of the amount of initial fixed capital 
cxpcnditur abour Utilization Relief (LUR) incentives 
lcn h of 
x h·o 1 i cJ v . 
' : 











biased. toward capital intensive industries. However in practice this 
does .not appear true. Based on the 1968 Census of Manufacturing, firms 
employing less than 51 full time workers accounted for 94% of total 
number of i ndustr i a l establishmentswhich in turn were classified as 
labour-intensive industries (this is measured in terms of fixed asset 
per worker).1 Since establishments with less than 51 full time workers 
were excluded from LUR incentive provision it can be argued that LUR 
provisions discriminated against the medium and small sized establishments 
1vh i ch form the bulk of 1 abour-i ntens i ve i ndus tries. 
Another deficiency of LUR provision can be traced from its 'step 
function' feature. Apart from the condition for 'additional years' 
LUR incentives granted tax holidays according to the number of full time 
workers employed in a firm. This is illustrated'.in diagram 3. 
Qiagram I I I 
~step function feature 
Labour Utilization+ tax holiday+ 51-100 employees 
101-200 employees 
201-350 employees 
351-More employees - 
2 years (Step 1) 
3 years (Step 2) 
4 years (Step j) 
5 years (Step 4) 
Labour Utilization Relief Incentives deficiency revealed by 'step 
function' feature is argued by Teh Kok Peng. At the margin of the step 
for int nc between Step l and Step 2, a firm has a strong motivation 
to mrl y ex r full irn worker in order to enjoy extra one year tax 
h lic!1y. uowcv r in h m i dd l of (ch ~ · p , th mo t i v ti n fa firm· 
--------~--~--------~------~--- 
l. S or i9n m n , .mp l oym nd ll Profit - \·J 
n( Lio in 11 M111ll I c tur i nq ·' .c r of ~L. t M1 lays i: 11t r 1 ly Pr f. 











employ more workers is very low since a large number of extra full time 
workers is required in order t~ enjoy an extra tax holiday of one year. 
At the end of the step i~e. Step 4, a firn~motivation to employ more 
than 351 full time workers is very low indeed, since a firm is still 
granted a maximum of five years tax holiday. 
Locational Incentives (LC) were also introduced and were especially 
designed to redressregional imbalances. Apart from other conditions, 
provision of l ocat i ona l incentives stated thatto qua l i fy a f'irrn must locate 
in the less developed states. Based nn the findings of Federal Indus tr i a l 
Development Authority (FIDA) Report 1973 locational incentives were 
ineffective to attract investors into less developed states. For instance 
in 1969 about 80.3% of total approved companies were located in four 
developed states. After a 10 year period, on•y 12% of total approved 
.. 
industries in less developed states were granted concessions under .locational 
inc-entives.1 Moreover, the government's task. to redress regional imbalances 
was aggravated by foreign investors. For instance, based on table 4.4 
89.2% of total foreign investment was located in the four developed states, 
whereas local investment was somewhat more dispersed. The tend~ncy 
for foreign investors to set up their establishments in the four developed 
states was understandable as foreign investors were generally involved 
with capital intensive industries which demand sophisticated industrial 
infrastructurul focilitics which were readily eva l l eb lc in the more 
developed t p,rticul rly in Selangor, Perak, Johore and Penang. 
It eppc rs hcrcforc th. t fiscal incentives formulated under the Investment 
lnccn iv AcL 196 , , Lr, c · d +nappropr t: t t chno lony wh i ch vo s 
1. An ilppraiC)al of the Inc ntiv. 
Mil 1 y) i 1 - M. f\hclu 11 ah , p . l O, 
Jun 1900. 
rorr.inn Inv m.nt in 














No.of % of No.of % of 
E Loca 1 Loca 1 Foreign Foreign 
SE LANGOR 2767 26.7 276 40.4 
PEN ANG 1540 14.8 65 9.5 
PER/\ K 1901 18. 3 43 6.3 
JOHORE 1232 11. 9 226 33.0 
71 . 7a 89.2a 
N.SEMBILAN 417 4.0 20 2.9 
MALACCA 
. 
412 4.0 17 2.5 
PAHANG 503 4.9 8 1. 2 
KEO AH 785 7.6 12 1. 7 
KE LANT AN 411 3.9 13 1. 9 
TRENGGANU 322 3. 1 ' . 4 0.6 .. 
PERLIS 86 0.8 - - 
TOTAL 10,376 100.0 684 100.0 . 
N.B. a~ Total percentages of 4 Developed States 
Source: Compiled from Department of Statistics, Census of Manufacturing 
Industries. Peninsular, Vol. l Government Printer, K.L., 1973. 
lnconsist nt with government objectives in the 1970s to create more jobs. 
linr1 lly, f t s c 1 inc n iv provision were b i ascd against the small 
und m i um l z d c t bl i hmcnt . This is par t ly because fiscnl incentives 
favoured th Cupit int n iv industries 1t1hich g ner a l ly ar lqrge - 
c 10 s hli!';lirncnt~1 
int n iv r a hr th n labour in nsivc cs ab l i shm nt. h Cdl 










"the tax holiday would be a factor for firms with fixed 
investment of around and below $1 ,000,000. That it has 
influenced as many as four fi~ms out of a sample of 
fifty-two (even smaller, excluding those with fixed 
investments much greater than $1 ,000,QOO) in their choice 
of equipment seems to make its capital inte9sity bias 
important enough for action to correct it". 
•' 
This situation calls for government attention to introduce a new industrial 
Policy which provides e~ual footing for the small and medium sized firms 
to progress and contribute to the development of ancillary industries 
in .the future. 
Moreover, fiscal incentives in attracting foreign investment also· 
accentuated the bias toward capital intensity. This is observed by 
Gerald Tan , 
. ' 
"The basic point is that foreign owned companies tend to 
use more capital intensive technology than'.do local firms. 
This is true for the entire manufacturing sector as well as 
almost every specific industry within manufacturing. For 
every dollar of investment or for every unit of output, 
foreign firm createfe\'1erjobs than local ones ."? 
Another criticism of fiscal incentives is that in their implementation 
there was a distincf lack of clear cut criteria in regard to eligibility, 
Which in practice favoured the capital intensive larger establishments 
Which often qualified for privileges under several incentive schemes. 
This is stressed by Teh KoY. Peng, 
"the criteria for enjoying the Pioneer Industry Incentives are 
r( herb d o tha t of the eligible firms,some·for example, 
1·1ould b l i q i b l c for ITC u well,cind vice ver s a , the same 
Pf)l ic'i f r Um nd Lh fl.Of\. Put di ffcrcntly, the luck of 
1 c cr t ri be tv n incentives moans that more firms 
in pr inc i p l be e l i q i b l for most or all of thcm."3 













In addition, the lack of explicit criteria allows greater 
'j 
possib i lities for a firm to engage in lobbying and other form of 
rent-seeking activities which offer scope for corruption. If such 
illegal activities exist it will involve a resource cost to society and 
also will create bureaucratic ineptitude. Possibility for greater 
rent-seeking activities is clearly remarked by Teh Kok Peng i.e., 
"the lack of explicit criteria again confers greater discretionary 
powe r on government officials. Finns uncertain of their · 
eligibility for a particular incentives or any incentives at 
all would be motivated in lobbying and other rent-seeking 
activities as long as the expected benefits exceed the cost 
(including the bribe payments). We have the usual resource 
costs of such activities and the discrimination against the 
s ma l 1 er f i nn s . " ! 
Efforts should be reoriented to refonn the fiscal policies, which 
could meet the needs of government priority development projects. For .. 
instance, in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981 ~ 1985) the government has 
identified the need to have more linkages within the manufacturing 
sector: One way is by the establishment of irnport-sVbstitution on 
investment goods.or capital goods. This has led to the formation of HICOM 
(Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia) which ensur~further upstream 
and dow~stream linkages in the manufacturing activities. However, at 
Present, it is constrained by the shortage of skillt<lmanpower and to 
achieve this development process, fiscal incentives could be granted to , 
inv star which more specifically fall in line with the government's 
aspiration . 
M.11tiy~;l also needs to strengthen furthe the techno-economic base 
in h. cconomj in or .r or .n r t intc9r o indu r i a l i t+on and 
thi~ could b comp lcm ntco by formu1Jtin9 inccn ivcs ~r 11· d o inv ors 
1 · T .h Kok Pcnc1, 
VI . 11 1 · • ..._!_ ' I I V 1 I --- 
i .c 1 lncnnt tvcs t nd 1nd11~ 










who could achieve these viable development projects. This requires 
a more selective approach in the government's administration in order 
to welcome the 'quality' investors who would provide skill development, 
manpower training and linkages within the sectors. Special incentives, which 
are . mainly granted "to footloose i ndu's t.r t es need to be revised, in order 
to reflect government priority development projects. A reform of 
fiscal incentives must not neglect the contribution of small and medium 
size establishmentsto the growth of the manufacturing sector and this 
equallyappliesto tariff protection policy which is examined in the next 
section. 
~ct ion II - Ta riff Protection Po 1 icy 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the preindeoendence days tariff policy 
f 
mainly served as a revenue instrument and the do~estic market was 
virtually unprotected, particularly under a system of Commonwealth 
Preferences. 
As Malaysia embarked upon an industrialisation policy based upon 
import substitution tariff protection became more important, although 
in the initial stages protection was spmewhat less than many other 
developing countries at a similar stage of development. It is not 
until the second half of the 1960s that tariffs become established as 
effective protective instruments. Gradually an increased number of 
in u L .. 1' 1 <> \•/Cr granted t riff protection such as various food type 
indw ry, ch .nii cal n chemic l products industry, basic metal industry, 
non-me ( 11 ic nroduc r 1 n us I y I Ill 
indu try. 
1 products +ndus t ry and mi ·c l l a n ou 
Ace rd i ng o 01 1 
He'"t M·lluyr.-)1· . 19Gr: • , n :.> ..,,, r 
c lculr i nr; nom ln: 1 pl L 










manufacturing, while the effective protection rates were 8% and 11% 
resp~ctively. In contrast in the Philippines, based on the same year 
the norni na l rates of protection on primary goods and manufacturing 
activity were 22% and 29% respectively, while effective protection 
ranged from 14% in primary goods production to··53% for the manufacturing 
sector. 
1 
Whilst Philippine rates of protection may have been unduly 
high it is quit~ apparent that Malaysian rates were unusually low. 
Undoub.tedly the vested interests of the rubber and tin mini.ng sectors 
Were persuasive in restraining tariff rates, but it aprears that the 
Malaysian government was clearly aware of the problems associated with 
unduly high iariff protection, especially the problems of inefficiency 
and monopoly profits. A conscious effort of the government to have a low 
Protection rate was clearly laid down in the Fir3t Malaysia Plan (1966 - 
1970); 
"the government, however is intent on ensuring that no more 
~rotection than is necessary will be accorded for the cost of 
industrialisation to the domestic consumer must be minimised. 
The government is also intent that tariff protection will not 
be afforded for periods longer than are absolutely necessary. 
The growth of the industrial sector in the lonq-run will demand 
that eventually production be extended to supply not only the 
domestic market but alsomarkets overseas. This makes it 
.ss ntinl th t domestic enterprises be constantlyprodded to 
incrcas efficiencv so that there will be progressive 
r duction in production costs."2 
S v ttl stu ics have examined the levels of tariff protection in 
Pen in(' u 1 
1· f·I l tY i th s include Edrta rds, Power, Ariff and Von Rabenau. I 
Th i" e u 1 ' of hcc . tud i are summar i ed in table 4.5 and indicate 











results are not consistent with each other, due to differing methodologies 
it is quite evident that Malaysia transformed itself from a low tariff 
country in the early 1960s to a fairly highly protected country by 
1970. 
No~inal Protection Rate {NPR)tends to understate the level of 
protection given to the final product which mainly influences the 
consumer's decision. However, the Effective Protection Rate (EPR) 
reveals the extent of protection given to the production process which 
affe'cts the investors' decision and hence resource allocation. Effective 
Protection Rate (EPR) can be measured under the Carden method or 
Balassa method. Generally the Carden method will reveal lower effective 
protection than the ~alassa method. This is because the Carden method, 
treats non-traded inputs as primary factors whith fonn part of the 
value added which is therefore higher but yields lower effective protection 
On the other hand, the Balassa method, treats non-traded inputs as trade 
inputs with zero tariffs. 
From table 4.5 it is clearly seen that Peninsular Malaysia's nomirial 
and effective rates of protection have substantially increased in the 
1960s. For instance in 1965 ncmina l rates increased from 9% (Power) 
to 18% in 1970 (/\riff) and 23% in 1973 (Von Rabeneu ) • Evidence of 
cl ing t riff r tes in the manufacturing production process is shown 
by ff iv r f protection. For instance the effective protcct1on 
I' (und r Co en metho ) incr as es from 12% in 1965 (P011er) to 38% 
i n 1 9 7 0 ( I\ r i f ) , 11 3 9 % i n 1 9 7 3 ( Vo n Rd> e n a u ) . Th i c s u a t tho t the 
ITiilnif cturing sec or in P ninsul r MJlilysi was 9 n ra l ly lonk i n 
tovi rd imnort-"ub-> lit ti on r tiler than an cxpor t-] d rowth 1·11 
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